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1INTRODUCTION

Today, most individuals [in the United States] have online accounts of
some type. These include social media accounts, bank accounts, and
email accounts, among others. Generally, when someone asks for
access to the login information for, or [non-public] content of, a
personal online account, [the owner of that account] is free to say
"1no." But that is less true in the employment and educational contexts.
Employers may have the power to coerce access to personal online
accounts of individuals who are, or seek to become, their employees.
Similarly, educational institutions may have coercive power over those
who are, or seek to become, their students. When an employer or
educational institution asks for the login information for, or [non-
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public] content of, an employee's or student's online account, that
person may find it difficult to refuse.'
In recent years, there have been reported incidents where employers and
educational institutions have demanded, and received, such access. One of the
first reported instances of such conduct "surfaced in 2009 when the city
government of Bozeman, Montana, instructed [job] applicants to divulge their
usernames and passwords for social media sites, including Facebook, Google,
Yahoo, YouTube, and MySpace." 2 Another widely-reported incident involved
Robert Collins, a Maryland correctional supply officer, who sought to return to
work after taking family leave in 2010 and was "asked to log into his Facebook
account as part of his reinstatement interview." 3 And another incident, this time
in the school setting, occurred "in Minnesota when a young female student
claimed her public school brought her into a room with a police officer present,
and forced her to provide her Facebook login information and email accounts
because of allegations that she had online conversations about sex with another
student." 4

In response, states have enacted legislation prohibiting such coercive
demands.' But that legislation lacks any real uniformity in definitions, in what
6
is prohibited, in exceptions, and in remedies for violations. And no federal law
7
exists to provide national uniformity. Given this lack of national legislation
and the need for uniformity, in 2013, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) saw
the need to fill the void through uniform legislation.
The ULC, "established in 1892, provides states with non-partisan, wellconceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical
areas of state statutory law." 8 The ULC is a nonpartisan, volunteer organization

1.
(UNIF.

UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT committee's prefatory note
LAW
COMM'N
2016),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%

20media%20privacy/ESOPPAFinal%20Act_2016.pdf.
2.
Jennifer Delarosa, From Due Diligence to Discrimination:Employer Use of Social
Media Vetting in the HiringProcessandPotentialLiabilities,35 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 249,256
(2015).
3.
Jeffrey Stinson, Password Protected: States Pass Anti-Snooping Laws, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (July 8, 2014),

http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-

analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/07/08/password-protected-states-pass-anti-snooping-laws.
4.
Delarosa, supranote 2, at 25 6-57.
5.
See infra Part III.
6.
UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT committee's prefatory note
(UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N
2016),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%2
Omedia%20privacy/ESOPPAFinal%20Act_2016.pdf.
7. Id
8.
About
the
ULC,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N,
http://unifom-laws.org/
Narrative.aspx?title=About the ULC (last visited May 1, 2017).
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that, over the years, has promulgated "more than 300 acts that secure
uniformity of state law when differing laws would undermine the interests of
citizens throughout the United States." 9 The ULC is made up of more than 300
commissioners "on uniform laws from each state, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands."' 0 The
commissioners must be members of the bar; are lawyers, judges, law
professors, and legislators; serve specific terms; and receive no salary for their
service with the ULC."
The ULC studied the issue and then decided to draft model legislation
addressing social media privacy in the employment and educational contexts,
given the importance of the topic and interests at issue and the need for
uniformity.1 2 In late 2016, after two years of drafting, the ULC promulgated the
Uniform Employee and Student Online Privacy Protection Act (UESOPPA) to
provide uniform legislation for states to adopt in addressing this important topic
to prevent coercive action.
The primary goal of UESOPPA is to enable employees and students (and
prospective employees and students) to decide whether, and when, to provide
actual and prospective employers and educational institutions access to their
personal online accounts.1 3 To accomplish this goal, UESOPPA prohibits
employers and post-secondary educational institutions from requiring, coercing,
or requesting that employees or students (or individuals who are seeking to
become employees or students) provide them with access to login information
for, or non-public content of, their personal online accounts.1 4 UESOPPA
further prohibits employers and educational institutions from requiring or
coercing these individuals to add them to the list of those given access to the
account (to "friend" them, in common parlance), although it does not prohibit
them from requesting to be added as a friend.
This Article provides background, context, and insight into the work that
yielded UESOPPA and what the Act does, and does not, protect and prohibit.
The Article begins with actions considered and legislation enacted by various

9. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N,
http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Frequently%/2OAsked%20Questions (lastvisitedMay
1,2017).
10. About the ULC, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT committee's prefatory note
(UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N
2016),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%2
Omedia%20privacy/ESOPPAFina%20Act_2016.pdf.
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id
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states starting in 2012 that prompted the ULC to study the issue.16 The Article
next discusses the drafting process, including work done by the Study
Committee that recommended the ULC undertake the draffing project, followed
by a discussion of the work of the Drafting Committee in preparing
UESOPPA.1 7 This discussion provides context for the text of, and commentary
for, UESOPPA as promulgated, but even more critically, some provisions that
were considered by the Drafting Committee but are not contained in UESOPPA
as promulgated.1

The Article then provides a detailed discussion of UESOPPA, including
definitions, scope, what it does (and, critically, does not do), and remedies
available for violations of the Act.1 9 As noted in the conclusion, UESOPPA
provides consistency and uniformity; builds on the best of the current state
enactments; and avoids ambiguities and uncertainties. The Act provides a
thoughtful balance of the issues and interests for all involved, including
protecting students and employees against coercive behavior. UESOPPA also
provides individuals, entities, and their representatives much needed
predictability and certainty for their conduct, relationships, policies, and
procedures. The hope is that the states will recognize the need for uniformity,
agree with the policies reflected in UESOPPA, and enact the Act to avoid the
20
uncertainty and unpredictability created by current law.
II.

BACKGROUND

In the United States, login-protected online accounts are pervasive.21
Although varying widely, estimates suggest that Americans have more than two
22
billion login-protected online accounts, ranging from social media accounts,

16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. Id.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part VI.
21. Indeed, the pervasiveness of such accounts has prompted study of Americans who do
not use the Internet. See Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, 13% ofAmericans Don't Use the
Internet. Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they ("13% of U.S. adults do not
use the Internet").
22. See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan.
12, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ ("Today around seven-in-ten Americans use
social media to connect with one another, engage with news content, share information and
entertain themselves."); see also Patricia Sanchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred
Boundaries:Social Media Privacyand the Twenty-First-CenturyEmployee, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 63,
67-68 (2012) [hereinafter Blurred Boundaries] ("Social media, in particular, has permeated
modem culture and the daily lives of the incoming workforce."); id at n. 16 ("Facebook, MySpace,
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to bank accounts, to email accounts, to any number of other types of password23
protected accounts. As of early 2013, it was estimated that nearly seven out of
ten American adults used Facebook alone.24
Login-protected online accounts are used in a variety of contexts, including
on the job, at school, or completely personally. Employers and potential
employers have begun asking employees and job applicants for their usernames
and passwords to their personal login-protected online accounts.25 Along with
those noted in the Introduction, other examples abound. In April 2011,
Kimberly Hester was placed on unpaid leave from her job as an elementary
school teacher's aide in Michigan when she "refused the school

Twitter, and LinkedIn boast a combined 1045 million worldwide users."); Greg Mgrditchian,
Note, Employment & Social Media Privacy: Employer Justificationsfor Access to "Private"
Material,41 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 108, 116 (2015) ("The world's two mostpopular
social media sites, Facebook and Twitter, have approximately 1.11 billion and 232 million active
users, respectively.").
23. Looking to Britain as a proxy, in 2012, "[t]he average Briton" was reported to have "26
online accounts." No Wonder Hackers Have It Easy: Most of Us Now Have 26Different Online
Accounts But
Only
Five
Passwords, DAILY
MAIL
(July
16,
2012),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2174274/No-wonder-hackers-easy-Most-26different-online-accounts--passwords.html. The current population of the United States is
approximately 325,000,000. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Mar. 20,2017). Conservatively, using half of each
number (162,500,000 Americans with an average of thirteen online accounts) would yield more
than two billion online accounts held by Americans.
24. See Sara E. Stratton, Note, PasswordsPlease:Rethinking the ConstitutionalRight to
InformationalPrivacy in the Context ofSocialMedia, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 649, 654 & n.39
(2014) (citing Maeve Duggan& Joanna Brenner, The State ofSocial Media Users, PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Social-media-users/The-State-ofSocial-Media-Users.aspx).
25. See id.; see also Alissa Del Riego, Patricia Sanchez Abril & Avner Levin, Your
Password or Your Paycheck?: A Job Applicant's Murky Right to Social Media Privacy, 3 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 17 (2012) ("Recently, there have been several reports of employers in the United
States requesting" thatjob candidates provide "access to their Facebook accounts before making a
hiring decision."); Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act That Balances
Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51 AM. Bus. L.J., 779, 779-81 (2014)
(providing additional examples of employers asking for applicants' social media login
information); Robert Sprague, No Surfing Allowed: A Review & Analysis of Legislation
ProhibitingEmployersfrom DemandingAccess to Employees' & Job Applicants'SocialMedia
Accounts, 24 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 481, 482 (2014) (summarizing the experience of Maryland
correctional supply officer Robert Collins); id at 495-96 (discussing surveys conducted on the
topic, including in March 2013, indicating that the prevalence was low but that such access was
being requested at times); BlurredBoundaries, supranote 22, at 68-69 (providing examples of
employees being fired for what they posted on social media); Mgrditchian, supranote 22, at 10809 ("[A] number of employers have gone so far as to require employees to disclose their login
information to social media sites they belong to in order to monitor their activity."); Stratton,
supra note 24, at 651 (citing examples of employers asking for applicants' social media login
information).
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superintendent's demand for access to her Facebook account."26 As another
example, "Justin Bassett, a statistician from New York City .

.

. finished an

interview and was asked to 'hand over his Facebook login information after the
interviewer couldn't locate his profile on the site."' 27
Employers have used other methods, short of requesting usernames and
passwords, to gather information about employees and applicants. One such
method is when employers "ask applicants to login to their social media profile
in the presence of a supervisor, allowing the supervisor to review the contents
of the applicant's site at that time," a practice "known as 'shoulder surfing."' 28
Another method is when employers "require[] the applicant to 'friend' a staff
member of the employer, thereby allowing that individual access to the
information on the social media site," sometimes referred to as "mandatory
'friending."'29 Yet another method is to have employees "change the privacy
settings on their social media network to make their profile publicly
available." 30
Particularly given the context, these behaviors have caused substantial
concerns about coercion.

'

Many scholars argue that an employee's consent to particular
employer demands is often suspect. One commentator argues
persuasively that requiring job applicants or employees to provide
their user name or login information so that employers can access
personal media accounts is inherently coercive, given the nature of the
relationship of the two parties.3
Similar conduct-and a similar concern about coercion-has arisen as a result
of educational institutions requiring such access to personal login-protected
online accounts of students and individuals applying for admission to
educational institutions.32

26. Sprague, supranote 25, at 482.
27. Stratton, supranote 24, at 651.
28. Delarosa, supranote 2, at 268-74.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Park, supranote 25, at 812 & n.168 (citing Nicholas D. Beadle, Note, A RiskNot Worth
the Reward: The Stored CommunicationsAct andEmployers' Collection ofEmployees' andJob
Applicants'SocialNetworking Passwords, 1 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 397,403 (2012)); see StevenL.
Willbom, ConsentingEmployees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 LA. L. REV.
975, 976 (2006) (noting as a "bottom line" that "consent within the employment relationship is
compromised and must be regarded with at least some skepticism").
32. See Delarosa,supra note 2, at 256-57 (referencing the Minnesota incident where "a
young female student" at a public school allegedly was brought into a room with a police officer
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Notwithstanding this conduct and these concerns, until comparatively
recently, the law offered no meaningful protection against such coercive
actions.33 Not surprisingly, various points of view have been offered about such
practices.34 Some employers have taken the position that access to personal
accounts is required to protect trade secrets or proprietary information, to
comply with federal law, or to prevent employer liability; others have
acknowledged that requiring access to personal accounts may be an invasion of
an employee's privacy.
Similar concerns have been expressed in the

&

present "and forced . . to provide her Facebook login information and email accounts because of
allegations that she had online conversations about sex with another student. The ACLU of
Minnesota filed a lawsuit in 2012 against the Minnewaska Area Schools and the Pope County
Sheriffs Office for violating the student's constitutional rights. Specifically, the ACLU-MN
argued a violation of the student's First Amendment right to freedom of speech and Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Minnewaska Area Schools
agreed to pay $70,000 to settle the lawsuit in March 2014 and to 'rewrite its policies to limit how
intrusive the school can be when searching a student's emails and social media accounts created
off school grounds."'); see also Blurred Boundaries, supra note 22, at 115 (citation omitted)
(noting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and stating "jurisprudence has
acknowledged that an employer's mere request for access to an employee's password-protected
site can constitute coercion, given the context of the employment relationship"); Michelle Poore, A
Callfor Uncle Sam to Get Big Brother out of OurKnickers: ProtectingPrivacy andFreedom of
Speech Interests in Social Media Accounts, 40 N. KY. L. REv. 507, 511 (2013) ("[T]here is a
disturbing emergence of reports of demands by public and private employers and academic
institutions for access to users' private social media account content."); Talon R. Hurst, Comment,
Give Me Your Password: The Intrusive Social Media Policies in Our Schools, 22 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 196, 196-97 (2014) ("'Forced consent' social media policies of schools and
universities have required students to give officials access to students' personal social media
accounts."); id. at 206-08 (discussing postsecondary schools requiring students to grant officials
access to their social media accounts).
33. BlurredBoundaries, supranote 22, at 112.
34. See, e.g., id at 69-71 (summarizing pros and cons of employer access).
35. Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords: 2016 Legislation, NAT'L
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Feb.
27,
2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-accessto-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx; see also Park, supra note 25, at 806 (citing Anita
Ramasastry, Can Employers Legally Ask for Your Facebook Password When You Apply for a
Job?: Why Congress and the States Should Prohibit This Practice, VERDICT (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/03/27/can-employers-legally-ask-you-for-your-facebook-passwordwhen-you-apply-for-a-job (exploring whether employer access to employee login information
violates law and arguing that legislatures should take action in this area)); BlurredBoundaries,
supra note 22, at 69-71 (summarizing pros and cons of employer access to employee social media
accounts). For a thoughtful discussion of ownership rights following the end of an employeremployee relationship, an important issue beyond the scope of this Article, see Susan Park
Patricia Sanchez Abril, DigitalSelf-Ownership: A Publicity-RightsFrameworkfor Determining
Employee Social Media Rights, 53 AM. Bus. L.J. 537 (2016).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/3

8

Thumma: When You Cannot Just Say No: Protecting the Online Privacy of Emp
2017]

WHEN YOU CANNOT "JUST SAY No"

9

36

educational context. Asked bluntly by one author, "[s]hould you have to
surrender your privacy to go to school or hold a job?"3 7
III. STATE LEGISLATION

Federal legislation addressing the issue has been introduced from time to
time but has never been enacted.38 In the states, however, these incidents have
prompted various legislative proposals and enactments.3 Starting with a
proposal in 2011, and continuing in earnest with enactments in 2012 and ever
since, these concerns have prompted state legislation to prevent coercing
employees to provide such information to get or keep a job, and to a lesser
extent, to provide protection in the educational context. 40
Although "Illinois was the first to propose a bill on May 18, 201 1," 4 1
Maryland was the first state to enact legislation protecting employees from
42
forced disclosure, and Delaware was the first state to enact legislation
protecting students from forced disclosure, both of which were enacted in
2012.43 By the end of 2012, fourteen states considered or enacted legislation
prohibiting, requesting, or requiring an employee, a student, or an applicant to
disclose a username or password for "a personal social media account." 44 Six
states enacted such legislation in 2012, with Maryland and Illinois enacting

36. Hurst, supranote 32, at 208-11 (summarizing views of "supporters" and "opponents"
of "forced consent" policies in the educational context).
37. Ken Kozlowski, 20 No. 12 The Internet Guide to Employer Access to Social Media
Passwords, INTERNET L. RESEARCHER (LegalWorks), Dec. 2015, at 2.
38. See Sprague, supra note 25, at 483-84 & n.12 (referencing "two federal bills, the
Password Protection Act of 2013 and the Social Networking Online Protection Act"); Delarosa,
supranote 2, at 259 (referencing proposed federal laws regarding requiring login information from
employees, students, and/or applicants).
39. See Richard W. Blackburn & Jeffrey J. Binder, 3 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 47:10 n.82 (Robert L. Haig ed., May 2017 update) (2017)
(citing Lynne Bernabei & Alan R. Kabat, Invasions of Privacy, NAT'L J. (July 23, 2012),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202563811801) ("[P]asswordrelated legislationhas been
prompted by several government agencies that required applicants and employees to disclose
nonpublic social media information. For example, some county sheriffs required applicants to
'friend' the sheriffs so they could check private Web sites.").
40. See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, supra note 35; see also
Sprauge, supra note 25, 482-83 ("In 2012, a total of twenty-eight bills were introduced in
Congress and fourteen states prohibiting employers from requesting or requiring username and
password access to employees' andjob applicants' personal online accounts. Four of the state bills
passed.").
41. Jordan M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers' Requests for Password
Disclosure, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 42, 43 (2014).
42. See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords,supranote 35.
43. Id
44. Id
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laws in the employment context, Delaware and New Jersey enacting laws in the
educational context, and California and Michigan enacting laws in both the
employment and educational contexts. 45 Looking at these 2012 enactments
provides context for subsequent proposals and enactments and for the
significant differences in current state laws addressing the topic.
A.

Maryland

"Maryland was the first state to enact a law protecting employees from
disclosing social media login information." 46 Maryland's law was introduced
on February 2, 2012, and signed by the governor on May 2, 2012, with an
October 1, 2012 effective date, making it the first state social media protection
act of many that would follow. 47 The Maryland enactment has been described

as "the first of its kind and marked the beginning of a nationwide trend of social
media privacy protection" in the employment context. 48 Adopting a structure
later followed in many other states, Maryland's enactment has four basic
components: (1) definitions; (2) prohibitions; (3) exceptions to the prohibitions;
and (4) enforcement authorization.
Maryland's enactment has just three defined terms.50 Maryland uses an
"electronic communications device" concept, expressly defining the phrase
broadly to mean "any device that uses electronic signals to create, transmit and
receive information," including "computers, telephones, personal digital
assistants, and other similar devices." Next, Maryland defines "employer" to
mean "a person engaged in a business, an industry, a profession, a trade, or
other enterprise" in Maryland or "a unit of State or local government" as well
as "an agent, a representative and a designee of the employer." 52 Finally, and
somewhat circuitously, Maryland defines "applicant" as "an applicant for
employment."

53

45. Id
46. Stratton, supra note 24, at 659.
47. 2012 Md. Laws ch. 233; Blanke, supra note 41, at 45-46.
48. Delarosa, supranote 2, at 256. For a detailed discussion and critique of Maryland's law,
see generally Alexander Borman, Comment, Maryland'sSocialNetworkingLaw:No "Friend"to
Employers and Employees, 9 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 127 (2014).
49.

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.

§ 3-712

(West, Westlaw through legislation July 1,

2017, of 2017 Reg. Sess.); Blanke, supra note 41, at 48.
50.

MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.

§ 3-712

(West, Westlaw through legislation July 1,

2017, of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
51. Id § 3-712(a)(3)(i)-(ii).
52. Id § 3-712(a)(4).
53. Id § 3-712(a)(2).
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For prohibitions, Maryland provides that "an employer may not request or
require that an employee or applicant disclose any user name, password, or
other means for accessing a personal account or service through an electronic
communications device." 54 Maryland also provides that an employer may not
"discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize or threaten to discharge, discipline,
or otherwise penalize an employee for an employee's refusal to disclose" such
information or "fail or refuse to hire any applicant as a result of the applicant's
refusal to disclose" such information.
Maryland includes prohibitions
applicable to an employee, directing that "[a]n employee may not download
unauthorized employer proprietary information or financial data to an
employee's personal Web site, an Internet Web site, a Web-based account, or a
similar account." 5 6

For exceptions to these prohibitions, Maryland allows an employer to
"require an employee to disclose any user name, password, or other means for
accessing nonpersonal accounts or services that provide access to the
employer's internal computer or information systems." Maryland "does not
prevent an employer . .. based on the receipt of information about the use of a
personal Web site, Internet Web site, Web-based account, or similar account by
an employee for business purposes, from conducting an investigation for the
purpose of ensuring compliance with applicable securities or financial law, or
regulatory requirements."
Similarly, Maryland "does not prevent an
employer ... based on the receipt of information about the unauthorized
downloading of an employer's proprietary information or financial data to a
personal Web site, Internet Web site, Web-based account, or similar account by
an employee, from investigating an employee's actions.
60
For enforcement, when Maryland's Commissioner of Labor and Industry
determines the enactment is violated, "the Commissioner shall" try to resolve
the issue "informally by mediation" or ask Maryland's attorney general "to
bring an action on behalf of the applicant or employee." 61Maryland's attorney
general then has the statutory authorization to seek "injunctive relief, damages,
or other relief."

62

54. Id § 3-712(a)(b)(1).
55. Id § 3-712(c).
56. Id § 3-712(d).
57. Id § 3-712(b)(2).
58. Id § 3-712(e)(1).
59. Id § 3-712(e)(2).
60. Id § 3-712(f); see id. § 3-101(b) (showing that when statutes in the title refer to the
Commissioner, that Commissioner is the Commissioner of Labor and Industry).
61. Id § 3-712(f)(1).
62. Id § 3-712(f)(2).
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Maryland set the stage, particularly in the employment context, for many
enactments that followed.63 According to one commentator, enactments in most
other states in the employment context "follow the broad contours set forth in
the Maryland statute," although "they diverge widely in the details." 64 But
Maryland's enactment may raise as many issues as it resolves. For example,
although protecting the ability to "access" both "a personal account or service"
and "nonpersonal accounts and services,"6 Maryland does not define these
terms. Similarly, no definition is provided for "employer's internal computer or
information systems."66 Maryland also does not define "applicable securities or
financial law," "regulatory requirements," or "employer's proprietary
67
information," arguably terms of art that are used in the enactment. Similarly,
Maryland does not define "employee," a phrase that can have quite different
meanings depending upon the context.
The terms that are defined in Maryland's law appear, at times, unbounded.
For example, by defining "employer" to include "a person engaged in ... a
trade,"' Maryland appears to include in the definition of employer individuals
who traditionally would be defined as employees. By contrast, the definitions at
times are quite restrictive. For example, defining "applicant" as "an applicant
for employment" 69 would appear to exclude individuals contacted by a potential
employer (perhaps through a recruiter), or those who contacted a potential
employer in an expression of interest (perhaps at a job fair or in response to a
posting for a position) but had not yet submitted an application for
employment. However, open issues and vagaries aside, Maryland's enactment
was the first and provided a foundation for many enactments that followed.70
B. Illinois
Although initially introduced on May 18, 2011, making it the first such
proposal in the country, Illinois formally enacted legislation applicable in the

63.

See Charles J. Stiegler, Developments in Employment Law andSocial Media, 71 Bus.

LAW. 321, 321 (2015) ("Twenty-one states have passed some version of a law intended to protect

.

employees from employer intrusion into personal online accounts .... Most of these laws are
loosely based on the Maryland provision . .
64. Id. at 322.
65. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712(b)(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through legislation
July 1, 2017, of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
66. Id § 3-712(b)(2).
67. Id § 3-712(e)(1)-(2).
68. Id § 3-712(a)(4)(i)(1).
69. Id § 3-712(a)(2).
70. Stiegler, supra note 63.
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employment context on August 1, 2012, with a January 1, 2013 effective date.
In doing so, in many respects, Illinois took a very different approach than
Maryland's law.
Illinois uses just one defined term: "social networking website." 72 Illinois
defines the phrase to mean "an Intemet-based service that allows individuals to:
(i) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, created
by the service; (ii) create a list of other users with whom they share a
connection within the system; and (iii) view and navigate their list of
connections and those made by others within the system." 73 Illinois expressly
exempts electronic mail from this definition.74
Turning to prohibitions, Illinois makes it
unlawful for any employer to request or require any employee or
prospective employee to provide any password or other related
account information in order to gain access to the employee's or
prospective employee's account or profile on a social networking
website or to demand access to such an account or profile.
For exceptions, Illinois provides that an employer is not prohibited from
obtaining "information that is in the public domain" or properly obtained under
76
the enactment.
Illinois also does not limit "an employer's right" to
"promulgate and maintain lawful workplace policies governing the use of the
employer's electronic equipment, including policies regarding Internet use,
social networking site use, and electronic mail use" as well as monitoring
"usage of the employer's electronic equipment and the employer's electronic
mail without requesting or requiring any employee or prospective employee to
provide any password or other related account information in order to gain
access to the employee's or prospective employee's account or profile on a
social networking website.
Thus, although enacted at about the same time as Maryland's law, Illinois
took a very different approach, limiting protections to true social networking
platforms and expressly exempting electronic mail (and, given the definition of

71. See 2012 Ill. Laws P.A. 87-807; Blanke, supranote 41. Although later amendments
changed somewhat the language in Illinois's statute, this Article focuses on the original language
in the 2012 enactment.
72. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10(b)(6)(A) (West, Westlaw current throughP.A. 10025 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id 55/10(b)(1)(A).
76. Id 55/10(b)(3)(A).
77. Id 55/10(b)(2).
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"social networking website," excluding from its protections other loginprotected accounts like bank, credit card, and securities accounts). There was
no overlap between the defined terms used in Maryland and in Illinois and little
overlap in the terms used generally in the two states.79 So, from the start, these
two early enactors took very different approaches to legislation in the
employment context.
C. Delaware
In the educational context, Delaware's "Education Privacy Act," enacted
July 20, 2012, with an August 19, 2012 effective date, became the first state
law to afford social media privacy protection for students. 0 As with the
enactments in the employer context, Delaware's enactment in the educational
context has four basic components: (1) definitions; (2) prohibitions; (3)
exceptions to the prohibitions; and (4) enforcement provisions.
Starting with definitions, the Delaware enactment is limited to "public or
nonpublic institution[s] of higher education or institution[s] of postsecondary
education." 8 2 As defined terms, Delaware distinguishes between a student ("a
person which at all relevant times is admitted into the academic institution")
and an applicant ("a prospective student applying for admission into the subject
academic institution"). 83 Delaware also includes definitions for social
networking and physical devices.8 4
"Social networking site" means an internet-based, personalized,
privacy-protected website or application whether free or commercial
that allows users to construct a private or semi-private profile site
within a bounded system, create a list of other system users who are

78. Id 55/10(b)(6).
79. Compare MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West, Westlaw through legislation
July 1, 2017, of 2017 Reg. Sess.), with 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10 (West, Westlaw current
through P.A. 100-25 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
80. 78 Del. Laws, c. 354 §1 (2012); Gary Gansle, Jessica Linehan & Kurt Whitman, No
Passwordfor You: California Enacts Social Media Privacy Laws Affecting Employers and
Postsecondary Educational Institutions, 17 No. 10 CYBERSPACE L. 1 (2012) (noting that
"California becomes the second state, joining Delaware," to enact such legislation). Although the
Delaware act directed the addition of Chapter 94 to Title 14 of the Delaware Code, the enactment
was codified in Chapter 81 of Title 14. Compare 78 Del. Laws, c. 354 §1 (2012), with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14 §§ 8101-8105 (West, Westlaw current through 81 Laws 2017, chs. 1-66).
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §§ 8101-8105.
82. See id. § 8103; see also id. § 8102 (defining the academic institutions that are referred
to in id § 8103).
83. Id § 8102(b), (e).
84. Id § 8102(c), (d).
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granted reciprocal access to the individual's profile site, send and
receive email, and share personal content, communications, and
contacts.8 5

Further, "'[e]lectronic communication device' means a cell telephone, personal
digital assistant, electronic device with mobile data access, laptop computer,
pager, broadband personal communication device whether mobile or desktop,
,,16
2-way messaging device, electronic game, or portable computing device.
Delaware then sets forth broad prohibitions. Specifically, "an academic
institution shall not": (1) "request or require that a student or applicant disclose
any password or other related account information in order to gain access to the
student's or applicant's social networking site profile or account by way of an
electronic communication device"; (2) "require or request that a student or
applicant log onto a social networking site, mail account, or any other internet
site or application by way of an electronic communication device in the
presence of an agent of the institution so as to provide the institution access"; or
(3) "request or require a student or applicant to add the employer or its
representative to their personal social networking site profile or account."8 7
Delaware also makes plain that "[a]n academic institution is prohibited from
accessing a student's or applicant's social networking site profile or account
indirectly through any other person who is a social networking contact of the
student or applicant." And the final prohibition states that "[n]o public or
nonpublic academic institution shall monitor or track a student's or applicant's
personal electronic communication device by installation of software upon the
device, or by remotely tracking the device by using intercept technology." 8 9
Delaware provides that "[a]n academic institution may not discipline, dismiss
or otherwise penalize or threaten to discipline, dismiss or otherwise penalize a
student [or fail or refuse to admit any applicant] for refusing to disclose any

85. Id § 8102(d).
86. Id § 8102(c).
87. Id § 8103(a), (b), (d). The reference in the third of these prohibitions to "the employer
or its representative" appears misplaced in an act addressing academic institutions, not employers.
That specific phrase, however, does not appear to have been a part of any legislation enacted when
Delaware enacted the provision or since that time. In context, the proper phrase would appear to
be "add the academic institution or its representative," but the statute reads as quoted in the text.
88. Id § 8103(e).
89. Id § 8103(c). This final prohibition is expressly applied to every "public or nonpublic
academic institution," while the others are applicable to every "academic institution." Compare
id, with id § 8103(a), (b), (d), (e). Because the statute defines "academic institution" as "public or
nonpublic" institutions of higher or postsecondary education, it is unclear whether this reference is
to make the prohibition applicable to all schools, regardless of the age of their students, or is
included for some other reason.
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'

information" protected in the first two categories ofprotected information.9 0 No
similar prohibition applies to the other prohibitions in the Delaware law. 9
The exceptions state the protections "shall not apply to investigations
conducted by an academic institution's public safety department or police
agency who have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, or to
an investigation, inquiry or determination conducted pursuant to an academic
institution's threat assessment policy or protocol." 92
Delaware does not include any express enforcement provisions. 93
D.

New Jersey

Introduced on May 10, 2012, New Jersey approved an act "prohibiting the
requirement to disclose personal information for certain electronic
communications devices by institutions of higher education" effective
94
December 3, 2012. New Jersey's law appears to have been modeled on
Delaware's law, with some significant differences.95
The New Jersey definitional terms are nearly identical to those used in
96
Delaware. Although not defining student, New Jersey defines "applicant,"
"electronic communications device," "public or private institution of higher
education," and "social networking website" in nearly identical ways to
97
Delaware. The one exception is that New Jersey expressly states a public or
private institution of higher learning includes "any employee, agent,
representative, or designee of the institution."9 8
The New Jersey prohibitions broadly protect a student or applicant from
disclosing information regarding a social networking website, stating "[n]o
public or private institution of higher education in [New Jersey] shall"
(1) [r]equire a student or applicant to provide or disclose any user
name or password, or in any way provide access to, a personal account
or service through an electronic communications device; (2) [i]n any
way inquire as to whether a student or applicant has an account or
profile on a social networking website; or (3) [p]rohibit a student or

90. Id § 8104.
91. Id
92. Id

§ 8105.

93. Id §§ 8101-8105.
2012 N.J. Laws, c. 75, § 1.
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §§ 8101-8105, with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:3-29Westlaw current through L. 2017, c. 115 and J.R. No. 10).
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 8102, with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-29.
Id
98. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-29.

94.
95.
32 (West,
96.
97.
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applicant from participating in activities sanctioned by the institution
of higher education, or in any other way discriminate or retaliate
against a student or applicant, as a result of the student or applicant
refusing to provide or disclose any user name, password, or other
means for accessing a personal account or service through an
electronic communications device.
In conjunction with these broad prohibitions which, among other things,
preclude a school from asking if a student or applicant has an account or profile
on a social networking website, New Jersey contains a novel provision
prohibiting waivers of the protections set forth in the act:
No public or private institution of higher education in this State shall
require a student or applicant to waive or limit any protection granted
under this act. An agreement to waive any right or protection under
this act is against the public policy of this State and is void and
unenforceable.' 00
Unlike Delaware, New Jersey contains no express exceptions to these
protections.101 Unlike Delaware, New Jersey does, however, have express
enforcement provisions, including providing that an aggrieved person, "in
addition to any other available remedy," may file a civil action for violations of
the protections.102 The remedies available for a violation include injunctive
relief, "compensatory and consequential damages incurred bythe applicant as a
result of the violation, taking into consideration any failure to admit the
applicant in connection with the violation," as well as reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs.103 An aggrieved "current or former student" is authorized to
obtain similar relief.1 04

E.

California

In 2012, along with Maryland and Illinois (each in the employment
context) and Delaware and New Jersey (each in the educational context),
California and Michigan enacted laws in both contexts. o0California was the

99. Id § 18A:3-30.
100. Id § 18A:3-31.
101. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 8105, with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:3-29-32.
102. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §§ 8101-8105, with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-32.
103. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-32(a).
104. Id § 18A:3-32(b).
105. See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords,supranote 35.
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first state to enact laws in both contexts, with provisions introduced in February
2012 and signed by the governor on September 27, 2012. o0
The California legislation in the employment context 0 7 was titled
"EMPLOYER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA" but defined "social media" more
broadly than a more traditional definition of the phrase. os In the sole definition
contained in the enactment, California defines "social media" as "an electronic
service or account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos,
still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email,
online services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations."1 09 Thus,
any online account or service, apparently whether password-protected or not
and whether publicly available or not, is included in the California definition of
"social media" in the employment context.
The California prohibitions state that "[a]n employer shall not require or
request an employee or applicant for employment" to "[d]isclose a username or
password for the purpose of accessing personal social media"; "[a]ccess
personal social media in the presence of the employer"; or "[d]ivulge any
personal social media" unless a statutorily enumerated exception applies.' o
These prohibitions raise various questions that do not appear to be resolved by
the statute. For example, by referencing "username or password," it is uncertain
whether this would account for technology security advancements (such as
fingerprint or facial recognition technology) that do not require a username or
password. As another example, the prohibition of an employer from requiring
disclosure of a username or password "for the purpose of accessing personal
social media," suggests that an employer could require the disclosure of a
username or password for other purposes. And although defining "social
media" broadly, the statutory term "personal social media" is not a defined
term.
Turning to the exceptions, California provides the following:
Nothing in this section shall affect an employer's existing rights and
obligations to request an employee to divulge personal social media
reasonably believed to be relevant to an investigation of allegations of
employee misconduct or employee violation of applicable laws and

106. Id For a near-contemporaneous overview of California's enactments, see Gansle,
Linehan & Whitman, supra note 80.
107. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 618 (West) (codified as CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West,
Westlaw current with urgency legislation through ch. 164 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)).
108. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980.
109. Id § 980(a).
110. Id § 980(b).
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regulations, provided that the social media is used solely for purposes
of that investigation or a related proceeding."'
But "reasonably believed" by whom? And what level of certainty would need
to support the "allegations of employee misconduct"? And what does "a related
proceeding" add?
Another exception states "[n]othing in this section precludes an employer
from requiring or requesting an employee to disclose a usemame, password, or
other method for the purpose of accessing an employer-issued electronic
device."1 2 Although providing clarity that such information could be
demanded for "an employer-issued electronic device," is it the access to the
device that can be demanded, or is it the access to the device and applications
on the device that can be demanded? And given that the prohibitions address
solely "username or password," is the exception for "other method for the
purpose of accessing" needed because it addresses something that is not, at
least textually, prohibited by the statute?
The California statute also defines what discipline an employer can and
cannot impose:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten to discharge or
discipline, or otherwise retaliate against an employee or applicant for
not complying with a request or demand by the employer that violates
this section. However, this section does not prohibit an employer from
terminating or otherwise taking an adverse action against an employee
or applicant if otherwise permitted by law.""13
This prohibition, however, discusses "a request or demand by the employer,"
while the prohibitions state an employer "shall not require or request.""14
Presumably, "demand" and "require" are intended to mean different things
(otherwise a single term would be used in both places), but what? And it is
unclear why the first sentence discussed "discharge, discipline, threaten to
discharge or discipline, or otherwise retaliate," while the second sentence talks
of "terminating or otherwise taking an adverse action."'
California provides no express private enforcement mechanism in the
employment context. Indeed, the sole provision regarding enforcement states
that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the Labor Commissioner,

111. Id § 980(c).
112. Id § 980(d).
113. Id § 980(e).
114. Compare id. § 980(e), with id. § 980(b).
115. Id § 980(e).
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who is Chief of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, is not required to
investigate or determine any violation of this act.""'6
The California enactment in the educational context has a similar history,
with some similar provisions, but also with some important differences." 7
Introduced two days after the employer provision, the education provision
includes an express statement of legislative intent not included in the employer
provision:
The Legislature finds and declares that quickly evolving technologies
and social media services and Internet Web sites create new challenges
when seeking to protect the privacy rights of students at California's
postsecondary educational institutions. It is the intent of the
Legislature to protect those rights and provide students with an
opportunity for redress if their rights are violated. It is also the intent
of the Legislature that public postsecondary educational institutions
match compliance and reporting requirements for private nonprofit and
for-profit postsecondary educational institutions imposed by this act." 8
Using the same definition for "social media" adopted in the employer
provision," 9 the education provision states "[p]ublic and private postsecondary
educational institutions, and their employees and representatives, shall not
require or request a student, prospective student, or student group to" do the
same acts prohibited by the employer provision.120 It is unclear why the
reference to "their employees and representatives" is included in the education
provision but is not included in the employer provision. And the "except as
provided" exception to the prohibition on divulging personal social media
information in the employer provisionl21 is not contained in the education
provision.

116. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 618 (A.B. 1844) (West).
117. 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 619 (S.B. 1349) (West) (codified as CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
99120-99122 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through ch. 164 of 2017 Reg.
Sess.)).
118. Id
119. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120.
120. Id § 99121(a). Even then, however, there were some differences in the prohibitions that
context does not easily explain. For example, an employer is prohibited from requiring or
requesting disclosure of "a username or password for the purpose of accessing personal social
media," CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b)(1) (West, Westlaw currentwithurgencylegislationthroughch.
164 of 2017 Reg. Sess.), while a school is prohibited from requiring or requesting disclosure of "a
user name or password for accessing personal social media," CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121(a)(1).
Whether, and to what extent, this difference is intended to truly be a difference is unclear.
121. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b)(3) (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through
ch. 164 of 2017 Reg. Sess.).
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Significantly, the limitations on how information obtained in an
investigation in the educational context does not contain the limitation in the
employment provision that any social media obtained be "used solely for
purposes of that investigation or a related proceeding."1 22 Finally, the education
provision requires that the applicable school "shall post its social media privacy
policy on the institution's Internet Web site."1 23
These differences and apparent inconsistencies in these California
enactments have not been resolved by case law or legislatively. And some
would appear to cause mischief in attempting to reconcile identical, or nearly
identical, language used in two very different contexts. Regardless, California
was the first in the nation to enact legislation to protect personal online
accounts in both the employer and educational institution contexts.124
F. Michigan
Michigan was the second state to enact laws in both the employment and
educational contexts, with a proposal introduced in March 2012, signed by the
governor on December 27, 2012, and made effective December 28, 2012.125
Unlike California, Michigan did so in a single act called the "internet privacy
protection act,"1 26 the stated purpose of which is
to prohibit employers and educational institutions from requiring
certain individuals to grant access to, allow observation of, or disclose
information that allows access to or observation of personal internet
accounts; to prohibit employers and educational institutions from
taking certain actions for failure to allow access to, observation of, or
disclosure of information that allows access to personal internet
accounts; and to provide sanctions and remedies.127

122.

Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(c), with CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121.
123. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99122.
124. See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords,supranote 35.
125. Id As enacted, House Bill 5523 (2012) was codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§
37.271-37.278 (2012). H.B. 5523, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012) (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § § 37.271-37.278 (West, Westlaw current through P.A. 2017, No. 108, also 112 and
117, of the 2017 Reg. Sess., 99th Leg.)). In addition, House Bill 5623 (2012), which contained
similar provisions, was introduced in May 2012 and referred to a committee, but no further action
was taken. H.B. 5623, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012).
126. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.271-37.278.
127. H.B. 5523, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 37.271-37.278).
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For definitions, Michigan uses the phrase "personal internet account,"
defined as "an account created via a bounded system established by an internetbased service that requires a user to input or store access information via an
electronic device to view, create, utilize, or edit the user's account information,
profile, display, communications, or stored data."1 28 Although differing in
terminology from California's "social media" definition, the term covers
approximately the same ground, appearing to apply to any online service or
account.129 Significantly, Michigan's definition of "personal internet account"
does not appear to limit coverage to personal accounts, as opposed to Internetbased accounts that require a user to input or store information electronically. 3 0
For example, the definition as written appears to apply equally to a personal
Internet-based bank account as well as an Internet-based account provided by
an employer or school and used by the person solely for employer or school
purposes.
Michigan also expressly defines "access information," "educational
institution," and "employer."'13 1 ' Access information' means user name,
password, login information, or other security information that protects access
to a personal internet account."132 In contrast to California's legislation
applying only to postsecondary education, Michigan's definition of
"educational institution" includes schools of all kinds, including "an academy;
elementary or secondary school; extension course; kindergarten; nursery
school; school system; school district; intermediate school district; business,
nursing, professional, secretarial, technical, or vocational school; public or
private educational testing service or administrator; and an agent of an
educational institution."133 By express directive, "[e]ducational institution shall
be construed broadly to include public and private institutions of higher
education to the greatest extent consistent with constitutional limitations."1 34
"Employer" is defined as "a person, including a unit of state or local

128. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.272(d).
129. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a) (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation
through ch. 164 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (defining "social media"), and CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120
(West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation through ch. 164 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (defining
"social media"), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
account").

130.
131.
132.
133.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
Id § 37.272(a)-(c).
Id § 37.272(a).
Id § 37.272(b).

§ 37.272(d)

(defining "personal internet

§ 37.272(d).

134. Compare CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121 (West, Westlaw current with urgency legislation
through ch. 164 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (referring to public and private postsecondary education
institutions), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 37.272(b)

(including a broad range of schools and

education related institutions).
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government, engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other
enterprise in [Michigan] and includes an agent, representative, or designee of
the employer."1 35

In setting forth the prohibitions, Michigan provides that an employer "shall
not .

.

. [r]equest an employee or an applicant for employment to grant access

to, allow the observation of, or disclose information that allows access to or
observation of the employee's or applicant's personal internet account."1 36
Given the breadth of Michigan's definition of "personal internet account," this
could be read as precluding an employer from requiring an employee's
disclosure of information contained in the employer's Intemet-based account.
Michigan also provides that an employer shall not "[d]ischarge, discipline, fail
to hire, or otherwise penalize an employee or applicant for employment for
failure to grant access to, allow observation of, or disclose information that
allows access to or observation of the employee's or applicant's personal
internet account."137 In the educational context, Michigan enacted nearly
identical provisions, modified slightly to account for context.138
Turning next to exceptions, the Michigan enactment "does not prohibit an
employer from . .. [r]equesting or requiring an employee to disclose access
information to the employer to gain access to or operate" an "electronic
communications device paid for in whole or in part by the employer" or an
"account or service provided by the employer, obtained by virtue of the
employee's relationship with the employer, or used for the employer's business
purposes."139 These exceptions, then, counter some of the breadth of the
"personal internet account" definition.1 40 And the exceptions are both devicedriven (allowing access to everything on a device if even a portion ofthe device
was paid for by the employer) 141 and account-driven (allowing access to
everything in an account if even a portion of the account was "used for the
employer's business purposes").1 42
Michigan's exceptions do not prohibit employers from: "[d]isciplining or
discharging an employee for transferring the employer's proprietary or
confidential information or financial data to an employee's personal internet
account without the employer's authorization"; "[r]estricting or prohibiting an

135. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.272(b).
136. Id § 37.273(a).
137. Id § 37.273(b).
138. Id. § 37.274.
139. Id. § 37.275.
140. Compare id. (providing permissible employer acts related to access), with id.
§ 37.272(d) (defining "personal internet account").
141. Id § 37.275(1)(a)(i).
142. Id § 37.275(1)(a)(ii).
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employee's access to certain websites while using an electronic
communications device paid for in whole or in part by the employer or while
using an employer's network or resources, in accordance with state and federal
law"; or "[m]onitoring, reviewing, or accessing electronic data stored on an
electronic communications device paid for in whole or in part by the employer,
or traveling through or stored on an employer's network, in accordance with
43
state and federal law."1

As with California, Michigan has an investigation exception, which does
not prohibit an employer from
[c]onducting an investigation or requiring an employee to cooperate in
an investigation in any of the following circumstances: (i) If there is
specific information about activity on the employee's personal intemet
account, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with applicable laws,
regulatory requirements, or prohibitions against work-related
employee misconduct [or] (ii) If the employer has specific information
about an unauthorized transfer of the employer's proprietary
information, confidential information, or financial data to an
employee's personal internet account.1 44
Michigan's law also does not "prohibit or restrict" an employer "from
complying with a duty to screen employees or applicants prior to hiring or to
monitor or retain employee communications that is established under federal
law or by a self-regulatory organization" as defined in 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(26).145 Furthermore, Michigan "does not prohibit or restrict an
employer from viewing, accessing, or utilizing information about an employee
or applicant that can be obtained without any required access information or
that is available in the public domain."1 46
For educational institutions, Michigan also contains exceptions. 147 Akin to
the employer exceptions, Michigan does not prohibit "an educational institution
from requesting or requiring a student to disclose access information to the
educational institution to gain access to or operate . . . [a]n electronic

communications device paid for in whole or in part by the educational
institution" or "[a]n account or service provided by the educational institution
that is either obtained by virtue of the student's admission to the educational

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id § 37.275(1)(b), (d), (e).
Id § 37.275(1)(c).
Id § 37.275(2).
Id § 37.275(3).
Id § 37.276.
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institution or used by the student for educational purposes."1 48 And Michigan
"does not prohibit or restrict an educational institution from viewing, accessing,
or utilizing information about a student or applicant that can be obtained
without any required access information or that is available in the public
domain."1 49 There is no statutory investigatory exception applicable to schools.
Michigan law makes plain that the "act does not create a duty for an
employer or educational institution to search or monitor the activity of a
personal internet account."15 0 The act also provides that an employer or
educational institution is not liable for failing to request or require access to the
personal internet account of an employee, applicant for employment, student, or
prospective student. 151
For enforcement, Michigan provides statutory penalties and remedies for
violations.152 An employer or educational institution that violates the
prohibitions "is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$1,000.00."153 On the civil side, "[a]n individual who is the subject of a

violation of this act may bring a civil action" to enjoin the violation and "may
recover not more than $1,000.00 in damages plus reasonable attorney fees and
court costs."154 To recover civil damages, the individual seeking damages is

required to make a pre-litigation written demand "of the alleged violator"
seeking such damages.15 5 Michigan provides that "[i]t is an affirmative defense
to an action under this act that the employer or educational institution acted to
comply with requirements of a federal law or a law of this state." 5 6
G.

Other 2012 Legislative Proposals

In 2012, along with these enactments, legislative proposals addressing
online privacy protection in the employment or educational contexts were
introduced but not enacted in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington. 5 7 Other proposals and
enactments followed in subsequent years, 58 such that "a majority of states
(forty-four) and both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate have

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

§ 37.276(1).
§ 37.276(2).
§ 37.277(1).
§ 37.277(2).
§ 37.278.
§ 37.278(1).
§ 37.278(2).
§ 37.278(3).

157. Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords,supra note 35.
158. See Delarosa,supranote 2, at 257-58 (summarizing legislative proposals).
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either enacted or considered enacting employee password protection
legislation."1 59

Although these provisions evidence some common concerns and
protections, they contain significant and irreconcilable differences. These
differences include: (1) a "lack of uniformity" in definitions (including what
type of account or device is covered); (2) what the statutes prohibit; (3) what
exceptions exist; and (4) what remedies are available for violations. 16 As
referenced in hindsight, one commentator noted that the differences in the
employment context
provide a flavor of the idiosyncrasies that employers must contend
with. Any employer considering reviewing or accessing an employee's
or applicant's personal online or social media account for any
reason would be well served to tread carefully and to carefully
review the legislation (and pending legislation) of all states where it
'

does business.' 6

And as another commentator noted, "the differences from state to state are
significant enough that they will likely pose real challenges to multistate

159. Park, supra note 25, at 787-93; see id. App. A (providing a comparison of password
privacy legislation).
160. See Sprague, supra note 25, at 485-94 (summarizing similarities and differences in
provisions enacted as of early 2014 in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland,
Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington); see also Park, supra
note 25, at 788-93 (discussing differences in various state legislation and selected bills in "six
broad categories: (1) the parties to whom the statutes apply, (2) the applicable online accounts, (3)
prohibited acts, (4) exemptions or exceptions, (5) enforcement provisions, and (6) unique
provisions"); Sprague, supra note 25, at 510-11 (noting that, at that time, "[o]nly four of the
enacted statutes directly or indirectly address employees 'Friending' their employer," adding that
"New Jersey's statute prohibits employers from requiring an individual to waive or limit any
protection granted under its act as a condition for applying for or receiving an offer of
employment"); Stratton, supra note 24, at 662 (footnotes omitted) (noting Delaware law "only
protects applicants applying for admission into a university, not applicants applying for
employment," while "California's law only protects applicants to private employment, not
applicants to public employment," and Illinois "only protects applicants from being forced to
disclose social networking passwords, leaving open the possibility of employers being permitted
to request usernames and passwords to other social media websites, such as blogs"); see generally
Blanke, supranote 41 (providing a thoughtful, helpful, and detailed overview of state legislation
enacted in the area as of the date of the article, including similarities and differences in
enactments).
161. Stiegler, supra note 63, at 322; see Park, supra note 25, at 783 (noting that although
proposed federal enactments and state legislation have some similarities, they "differ dramatically
in a number of ways, including the specific prohibited acts, the definitions of important terms such
as 'social media' and 'personal account,' whether exceptions or exemptions apply, and language
regarding enforcement and penalties").
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employers as they attempt to navigate them."1 62 Significant criticism followed
as well.163 Not surprisingly, these state-to-state differences prompted some
commentators to suggest the need for uniform legislation addressing the
*164

topic.

Given this lack of federal action and significant lack of uniformity by the
states, and on the crest of what would follow in 2013 when legislation in one or
both contexts was considered in at least thirty-six states, 16 and after, 16 the
ULC saw the need to fill the void through one act addressing the issues that
would be promulgated for enactment by the states.167
IV. THE ULC DRAFTING PROCESS

There are several steps in the ULC's studying, drafting, and promulgating
legislation to be made available for enactment by the states. 16 The ULC's
Committee on Scope and Program receives proposals from a variety of
sources.169 If a proposal looks promising, the Committee on Scope and Program
then typically assigns the proposal to a study committee, "which researches the
70
topic and decides whether to recommend that an act be drafted."o
After that

162. Park, supra note 25, at 784 (noting the need for "model legislation" in the area).
163. Indeed, one commentator bluntly criticized the effort in an article written as of October
2013 titled "The Spectacular Failure of Employee Social Media Privacy Laws." Eric Goldman,
The SpectacularFailureofEmployee Social Media Privacy Laws, TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG
(May 31, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/05/statelaws-to-p.htm.
164. See Park, supra note 25, at 817 (noting issues that "lead to a conclusion that the
uniformity by adopting a model statute is desirable" and proposing such a provision); Hurst, supra
note 32, at 223 (footnotes omitted) ("It is critical to have uniform legislation prohibiting these
forced consent policies because it will prevent situations where students are made to choose
between cooperation and embarrassment, or between cooperation and penalization.").
165. Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords,supra note 35.
166. See Kozlowski, supranote 37 (summarizing then-current state enactments addressing
"employee (and a little bit of student) privacy and social media accounts," and stating "[w]ith this
number of states having already passed laws or having them in the pipeline, it is probably only a
matter of time before all 50 states follow suit"); Sprague, supra note 25, at 483-84 (footnotes
omitted) ("In 2013, at [sic] total of sixty-one such bills were introduced in Congress and thirty-five
states, with eight states enacting legislation. As of January 14, 2014, some thirty bills in sixteen
states have been reintroduced or carried over, with two states, Florida and Oklahoma, introducing
such legislation for the first time."); Brittanee L. Friedman, Note, #PasswordProtection:
Uncovering the Inefficiencies of and Not-So-Urgent Need for, State Password-Protection
Legislation, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 461, 463 (2015) (similar).
167. Minutes for Annual Meeting of the Committee on Scope and Program, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 11-12 (July 7-8,
2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Scope/
Scope%20Minutes%20070713%20FINAL.pdf.
168. FrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote 9.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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research, the study committee will recommend to the Committee on Scope and
Program whether to proceed with drafting.1 7 ' The Committee on Scope and
Program then considers the study committee's report and makes a
recommendation to the ULC's Executive Committee, and the Executive
Committee then determines whether a drafting project should proceed.172 If the
Executive Committee approves a drafting project, a ULC draffing committee is
created, consisting of ULC commissioners (one of whom will serve as chair of
the drafting committee), a Reporter (who is an expert in the field of law and
typically a law professor), Advisors from the American Bar Association, and
Observers, including those from interested organizations.1 73 The drafting
committee then researches, drafts, considers, and recommends an act for
consideration by the ULC Committee of the Whole, where all ULC
commissioners provide feedback on the draft and then vote on whether to
approve the draft.1 74 UESOPPA is the product of each of these typical steps.
A.

The ULC Study Committee

Martha L. Walters, Oregon Supreme Court Associate Justice and the first
female president of the ULC, is credited with first formally raising the idea of
studying whether the organization should draft an act on social media
privacy. 175 In July 2013, after considering research provided by ULC legislative
staff, the ULC Committee on Scope and Program noted
[a]s the use of social media has grown, so have employers' and
schools' concern about its employees and students use ofthose outlets.
It is not uncommon for employers to ask prospective and current
employees for access to social media accounts. In response, many
states have introduced or passed legislation aimed to protect

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Minutes for Annual Meeting of the Committee on Scope and Program, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 11-12 (July 7-8, 2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Scope/
Scope%20Minutes%20070713%20FINAL.pdf; The HonorableMarthaL. Walters, SUP. CT. OR.
JUD. DEP'T, http://www.courts.oregon.gov/Supreme/pages/biowalters.aspx (last visited Feb. 20,
2017).
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individuals from such intrusions, while allowing employers and
schools to access accounts under certain circumstances.17 6
As a result, the ULC Committee on Scope and Program adopted a
resolution, approved by the ULC's Executive Committee, "that a study
committee be formed to study the need for and feasibility of drafting an act on
social media privacy." 17

Frederick P. Stamp Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern
District of West Virginia and ULC Commissioner from West Virginia, served
as chair of the Study Committee on Social Media Privacy. 17 The Study
Committee was not charged with the responsibility of drafting an act, "but of
studying the subject and of conducting research to determine whether, in the
opinion of that committee, the subject is one on which an act should be
drafted."1 79

By January 2014, the Study Committee reported that it had reviewed a
great deal of background material and legislation on social media. so Noting
most of the material was in the employer and educational institution contexts,
the committee continued to consider other social media privacy concerns."s
After an April 2014 stakeholders meeting in Washington, D.C., and further
study, in May 2014, the Study Committee voted to recommend that the ULC
establish a drafting committee to draft an act on social media privacy.12
Based on the Study Committee's final report, the ULC Committee on
Scope and Program adopted a resolution in July 2014, approved by the ULC's
Executive Committee, "that a drafting committee on Social Media Privacy be
formed, and that the scope of the act be limited to issues related to employer's

176. Minutes for Annual Meeting of the Committee on Scope and Program, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 11-12 (July 7-8,
2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Scope/
Scope%20Minutes%20070713%20FINAL.pdf.
177. Id. at 11.
178. Minutes for Midyear Meeting of the Committee on Scope and Program, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 5 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Scope/Scope%20Minutes
%201-17-14%20FINAL.pdf; Frederick PfarrStamp Jr., WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Frederick Pfarr Stamp Jr. (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
179. Criteria for New Projects, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.uniform
laws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Criteria%20for%2ONew%20Projects (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
180. Minutes for Midyear Meeting of the Committee on Scope and Program, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 5 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Scope/Scope%20
Minutes%201-17-14%20FINAL.pdf
Frederick Pfarr
Stamp
Jr.,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FrederickPfarr StampJr. (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
181. Id
182. Minutes for Annual Meeting of the Committee on Scope and Program, UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 4 (July 12-13, 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Scope/Scope%
20Minutes%20071214%20FINAL.pdf.
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access to employees' or prospective employees' social media accounts and
educational institutions' access to students' or prospective students' social
media accounts."' 83
B.

The ULC Drafting Committee

The Drafting Committee on Social Media Privacy was created soon after
and held the first of its many meetings in November 2014.184 The Drafting
Committee's drafts were considered by the ULC Committee of the Whole (all
ULC commissioners) at the July 2015 ULC Annual Meeting, revised, and then
considered and approved by the ULC Committee of the Whole at the July 2016
ULC Annual Meeting.8 5 After some additional editorial changes, UESOPPA
was approved by the ULC Executive Committee in late 2016 and submitted to
the American Bar Association for approval. In February 2017, the American
Bar Association's House of Delegates approved UESOPPA "as an appropriate
[Act] for those states desiring to adopt the specific substantive law suggested
therein." 8 6 This drafting process, however, is best viewed in two stages: (1)
work leading up to the 2015 ULC Annual Meeting and (2) work leading up to
the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting.
1.

The Drafting Process Leading up to the 2015 ULC Annual
Meeting

The Drafting Committee met four times before the July 2015 ULC Annual
Meeting: (1) November 2014 (by telephone to discuss process, scope, and
scheduling); (2) February 2015 (by telephone to begin substantive discussions);
(3) three days in late February/early March 2015 (in person); and (4) three days
in April 2015 (in person).
Before the February 2015 in-person meeting, Drafting Committee Reporter
Professor Dennis D. Hirsch provided the Drafting Committee with a "structure
and variables" document, listing the structure of a draft act and identifying

183. Id at 4-5 (emphasis added).
184. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AMEmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
185. Id at 2.
186. ABA HOD Approves Five Uniform Acts, UNIF. LAW COMM'N (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=ABA%20HOD%2Approves%2OFive%2OUn
iform%20Acts.
187. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AMEmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
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some primary issues to consider.1ss The meeting started with an interactive
PowerPoint presentation by Sara H. Jodka, a labor and employment lawyer
with expertise in social media-related legal issues, demonstrating how various
social media platforms work and how they differ in terms of technology and
functionality.189 The Drafting Committee then engaged in a robust discussion,
worked through the issues identified in the structures and variables document,
and provided useful initial drafting guidance.1 90 After that meeting, Reporter
Hirsch prepared two separate draft acts (one addressing the educational context,
the other the employment context) to focus further discussion at the April2015
meeting.191 With the benefit of another robust discussion at the April 2015
meeting, the Drafting Committee prepared a single draft act that covered both
contexts, which was then presented to the Committee of the Whole (all ULC
commissioners) at the 2015 ULC Annual Meeting.192
During the drafting process, the Drafting Committee and the ULC solicited
input and viewpoints from a wide variety of individuals and entities with
various and conflicting points of View.1 93 Along with ULC commissioners, the
Drafting Committee included three American Bar Association Advisors as well
as dozens of Observers. Observers included individuals and representatives of
organizations representing, advocating for, and/or governing: colleges and
universities; the technology, securities, financial services, and banking
industries; state governments, legislatures, and courts; education; independent
businesses; victim's rights; privacy rights; social media service providers; ecommerce businesses and online consumers; and civil liberties organizations. 194
As with any group of individuals involved in any project, some Observers

188. Social Media Privacy Drafting Committee, Statutory Structure and Variables, UNIF.
COMM'N (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%20
media%20privacy/2015febl3_SMPAStatutory/o20Structure%20and%20VariablesHirsch.pdf.
189. Sara H. Jodka, SocialMedia PlatformsandPrivacyControls,PowerPoint Presentation,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N
(Feb.
2015),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?
title=Employee%20and%20Student%200nline%20Privacy/o20Protection%2OAct
(follow
February 2015 PowerPoint Presentation hyperlink).
190. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AM EmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
191. Id
192. Id at 2-3.
193. Id at 2.
194. See generally Social Media Privacy Drafting Comnmittee, Minutes for Conference Call,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N
(Nov.
17,
2014),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/
shared/docs/social%20media%20privacy/2014nov17_SMPAConfo2OCall_Minutes.pdf Social
Media Privacy Drafting Committee, Minutes for Conference Call, UNIF. LAW COMM'N (Feb. 5,
2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%20media%2Oprivacy/2015feb5_SMPA_
Conference%20Call%20Minutes.pdf.
LAW
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provided more input than others; Observers received updated drafts of the
project and provided critical insight and input throughout the project.195
The draft presented for discussion at the 2015 ULC Annual Meeting
introduced many concepts that were retained in the final act.196 For the
definitions used, that draft introduced a "protected personal online account"
concept that included accounts beyond traditional social media:
"Protected personal online account" means an individual's online
account that requires login information in order to access or control
that account. The term does not include an online account that:
(A) an employer or educational institution supplies or pays for;
(B) an employee creates or maintains on behalf of or under the
direction of an employer in connection with that employee's
employment; or
(C) a student creates or maintains on behalf of or under the
direction of an educational institution in connection with that
student's education.1 97

Recognizing the ongoing nature of the effort and the need for additional
study, the draft used bracketed language to reflect a tentative structure for the
definition of "educational institution," which was defined as "a person that
provides to students at the post-secondary[, secondary or middle-school] level
an organized course of study [that is academic, technical, trade-oriented or
preparatory for gaining employment in a recognized occupation.]"1 98 The
definition of "employer" was a simple sentence that would later change
significantly: "'Employer' means a person that provides compensation to an
employee in exchange for services or labor."1 99 And although it would later
change as well, the 2015 draft definition of "employee" was "an individual who
provides services or labor to an employer in exchange for compensation." 200
The term included a prospective employee who has expressed an interest in or

195. Id
196. Social Media Privacy Act: 2015 Annual Meeting Draft, UNIF. LAW COMM'N (June 1,
2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%2Omedia%2Oprivacy/2015AMSocialMedia
PrivacyDraft.pdf.
197. Id at 2.
198. Id at 1.
199. Id
200. Id
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applied for employment or whom an employer is otherwise considering for
201
employment.
The basic structure of the Act (setting forth definitions, protections,
exceptions, and remedies) provided a road map used throughout the drafting
process, although there were substantial changes along the way.202
Acknowledging the comparatively tentative nature of this early draft, the
Drafting Committee expressly solicited comments on various topics at the 2015
203
ULC Annual Meeting. An issues memorandum summarized the work of the
Drafting Committee, provided background on social media, discussed the scope
of the Drafting Committee's work, and sought input on specific issues.204 In
addressing scope, the Drafting Committee recognized that the employer and
educational institution contexts were not the only coercive situations that might
merit protection of social media privacy, but that the ULC Committee on Scope
and Program directed that the effort be confined to those two contexts:
The draft submitted is limited to preventing: (1) employers coercing
their employees or prospective employees to provide login information
for or access to their protected personal online accounts; and (2)
educational institutions coercing their students or prospective students
to provide login information for or access to their protected personal
online accounts. There may be other coercive situations (the landlordtenant relationship is one such situation that has been suggested) in
which individuals can be pushed to provide such information. The
scope of the Committee's work, however, is limited to the employment
and education contexts. This scope is consistent with the vast majority
of legislation enacted by the states. Accordingly, although recognizing
that there may be other coercive situations, the Committee has limited
(and will continue to limit) its work to these two critically-important
contexts.205
Although soliciting input on all aspects of the draft, the Drafting
206
Committee then highlighted four specific issues for consideration.

201. Id
202. See Social Media Privacy Act: 2015 Annual Meeting Draft, supra note 196.
203. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2 (June 1, 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%
20media%20privacy/2015AMSocialMediaPrivacylssuesMemo.pdf.
204. Id at 1-2.
205. Id at 2.
206. Id at 2-3.
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First, the Drafting Committee noted "there appears to be consensus that the
act should apply to post-secondary schools," but the Committee further noted
that it was "particularly interested in comments on whether the act should apply
to secondary or even middle-schools."20 7
Second, the Drafting Committee sought input on the definitions of
"employee" and "employer," noting that definitions of the "terms var[y]
substantially depending upon context and origin and that there is not one
generally-accepted definition of either term." 208 "The Committee has no desire
to attempt to provide new, whole cloth definitions of the terms." 209 "The draft

does, however, use comparatively broad definitions so that independent
contractors are included." 210 "The Committee is particularly interested in
comments on the definitions used." 2 11

Third, highlighting the use of the phrase "protected personal online
account," the Drafting Committee noted
[t]he draft protects all online accounts, not just social media accounts.
Existing state acts vary on this point. Some acts govern only social
media accounts, while others govern all personal online accounts. The
reasons for protecting social media accounts-to prevent employers
and educational institutions from using their coercive power in order to
invade a private realm appear to apply with equal force to personal
e-mail, messaging, photo-sharing, video-sharing and other such online
accounts. In addition, a significant number of states have adopted acts
protecting personal online accounts (not just social media accounts),
meaning a focus on protected personal online accounts may enhance
enactability. Accordingly, the draft applies to protected personal online
accounts, a phrase that would cover all login-protected, personal
online accounts. The Committee welcomes comments and thoughts on
this approach.2 12
Finally, the 2015 ULC Annual Meeting draft had a provision stating that
the protections of the Act generally could not be waived "[e]xcept where
necessary to demonstrate a skill or proficiency that is directly related to the
employee's employment or application for employment," or the "student's

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 3.
Id
Id
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education or application for admission to an educational institution." 213 The
Drafting Committee expressly solicited "input on the no waiver provision,
including whether the draft provides the proper exceptions to it."214

The Drafting Committee then entertained questions, comments, concerns,
critiques, and other offerings at the 2015 ULC Annual Meeting.215 The Draffing
Committee then continued its work to prepare a revised draft for final
consideration at the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting.
2.

The Drafting Process Leading up to the 2016 ULC Annual
Meeting

After receiving comments at the 2015 ULC Annual Meeting, the Drafting
Committee met five times before the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting: (1) two days
in November 2015 (in person); (2) two days in February 2016 (in person); (3)
in April 2016 (by telephone in preparation for review by the ULC's Committee
on Style); (4) in May 2016 (by telephone to discuss feedback from the ULC's
Committee on Style); and (5) in June 2016 (by telephone).2 16 These meetings
involved discussion of the comments received at the 2015 ULC Annual
217
Meeting
and from other interested individuals and entities, as well as

213. Social Media Privacy Act: 2015 Annual Meeting Draft, supra note 196, at 8; see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-31 (West, Westlaw current through 81 Laws 2017, chs. 1-66) ("No public or

private institution of higher education in this State shall require a student or applicant to waive or
limit any protection granted under this act. An agreement to waive any right or protection under
this act is against the public policy of this State and is void and unenforceable.").
214. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2 (June 1, 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%
20media%20privacy/2015AMSocialMediaPrivacylssuesMemo.pdf; see Park, supranote 25, at
822 (setting forth a proposed employee internet privacy act including a provision that "[t]he rights
provided by this Act may not be waived, by contract or otherwise").
215. See Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2 (June 1, 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%
20media%20privacy/2015AMSocialMediaPrivacylssuesMemo.pdf.
216. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AM EmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
217. Of particular interest is a twelve-page summary of the suggestions received at the 2015
Annual Meeting and the responses and summary of the changes that were incorporated. See
generally Memorandum from Dennis D. Hirsch to Social Media Privacy Drafting Committee,
UNIF.
LAW
COMM'N (Nov.
5, 2015),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
social%20media%2Oprivacy/2015nov6_SMPAReporter%20MemoComments%20and%20re
sponses.pdf.
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additional research, thought, and consideration by Drafting Committee
members, Advisors, and Observers.2 18
The "protected personal online account" concept identified by the Draffing
Committee early in the process was retained and refined.219 Accordingly, at the
2015 ULC Annual Meeting, the Committee on Scope and Program and the
Executive Committee approved the Drafting Committee's request for
clarification that the protected personal online account concept (which is
somewhat broader than a traditional definition of a social media account) did
not exceed the Drafting Committee's charge.220 Following this clarification, the
Executive Committee approved the Drafting Committee's request for a name
change from Social Media Privacy to Employee and Student Online Privacy
Protection, which is more descriptive of the focus and scope.22 Accordingly,
by the time of the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting, the Drafting Committee's name
had changed, and the draft was named the Employee and Student Online
Privacy Protection Act.222

The draft submitted for consideration at the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting
was substantially revised and refined from the draft considered at the 2015
223
ULC Annual Meeting. As relayed by the Drafting Committee in advance of
the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting,
[g]iven the robust discussion at and after the 2015 Annual Meeting, we
have had significant further discussions, evolution and refinement in
our work. The project also has attracted more and more active interest
and input from divergent groups who have thoughtful, deeply-held
perspectives on what the draft should and should not do and how the
draft should read. Along with input from Committee members,
Advisors and Observers, we have received input from industry groups
and companies; privacy advocates and consultants; trade associations;
academics; universities and colleges and many others. This additional
involvement and input, which is ongoing, is very much appreciated
and, although complicating significantly the work of the Committee,
has helped strengthen the current draft. The Committee also received,

218. See Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AMEmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
219. See id. at 3-4.
220. Id at 1.
221. Id
222. Id
223. Id at 2.
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accounted for and appreciates formal review and feedback from the
Style Committee.224
The Drafting Committee solicited input for the draft submitted for
consideration at the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting, highlighting five specific
issues:
1. As the table of contents demonstrates, the structure of the draft has
been revised somewhat from last year. For example, the "No Waiver"
provision (discussed more fully below) has been removed.
2. Definition of "Educational institution." Section 2(2). After
substantial consideration, input and research, the Committee
recommends that the Act apply only to postsecondary educational
institutions. As noted above, state legislation varies on this point.
Some state statutes apply to primary and secondary schools, in
addition to postsecondary schools. Although conceding there are
arguments for coverage in primary and secondary schools, the reasons
for the recommendation that the Act only apply to postsecondary schools
include the greater responsibility that primary and secondary schools have
for their students' welfare and the fact that the majority ofthe state statutes
limit coverage to post-secondary schools.
3. Definition of "Employee" and "Employer." Sections 2(5) and (6).
These definitions are broad and differ from those being proposed by
the Wage Garnishment Act Drafting Committee. This difference is
intentional for a variety of reasons, including that this Act is intended
to apply to prospective employees with respect to whom no employeremployee relationship yet exists (and may never exist). Similarly, the
protections in this Act do not depend upon the transfer of money, as
would appear to be the case in the context of the Wage Garnishment
Act.
4. Removal of "No Waiver" Provision. Given comments received
and further research, the Committee elected to remove a provision in
an earlier draft of the Act that would have prohibited employees and
students from waiving the Act's protections. In addition, the revised
draft allows an employer or educational institution to request that an
employee or student add the employer or educational institution to the

2 2 4. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

37

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
38

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 1

set of persons that are granted access to the individual's protected
personal online account (a "friend request," in Facebook terms). This
is consistent with the notion that privacy consists, in large part, of the
ability to control one's personal information and that voluntary waiver
is, accordingly, consistent with prevailing notions of privacy. [225 ] The
Act, however, still prohibits coercive action, meaning any waiver must
be voluntary.
5. Section 5 (Civil Action) has been changed and simplified. Section
5 now allows for a civil action by the [Attorney General] to obtain
equitable relief and a civil penalty of up to [$1000] for each violation
(with a maximum penalty of [$100,000] for the same act causing more
than one violation). Section 5 also allows an employee or student, or
prospective employee or student, to obtain equitable relief, actual
damages and costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The relief available
to an [Attorney General] and an employee or student, or prospective
employee or student, is not mutually exclusive.226
The Drafting Committee then entertained questions, comments, concerns,
critiques, and other offerings at the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting in two different
sessions, revising the draft in between the sessions. The draft was then
approved by a vote of the states on July 14, 2016, as the ULC Annual Meeting
ended.227
Following that approval, the final Act was submitted for review by the
ULC Committee on Style; those comments were accounted for and
incorporated into the Act, and in late 2016, the Act was then approved as a
uniform act228 by the ULC Executive Committee and named the Uniform

Employee and Student Online Privacy Protection Act (UESOPPA). On
February 6,2017, UESOPPA was approved by the American Bar Association's

225. See Steven L. Willbom, Notice, Consent, and Nonconsent: Employee Privacy in the
Restatement Symposium: Assessing the Restatement ofEmployment Law: Essay, 100 CORNELLL.
REv. 1423, 1430-38 (2015).
226. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 3-4 (June 10, 2016), http://www.unifomldaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AMEmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
227. UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLNE PRIVACY PROT. ACT §§1-10 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2016).
228. As used by the ULC, "[a] uniform act is one that seeks to establish the same law on a
subject among the various jurisdictions. When the term 'uniform' is used in the nation's laws, it is
highly likely that the ULC drafted the act. The ULC also promulgates 'model' acts. An act may
be designated as 'model' if the act's principal purposes can be substantially achieved even if the
act is not adopted in its entirety by every state." FrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote 9.
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House of Delegates "as an appropriate Act for those states desiring to adopt the
specific substantive law suggested therein." 229 With that approval, UESOPPA
officially became available for consideration by state legislatures for
enactment.230 To date, UESOPPA has been introduced as proposed legislation
231
in the legislatures of Minnesota, New York, and Hawaii.
In its work, the Drafting Committee tried to identify the best policies and
practices on numerous key issues. In doing so, the Drafting Committee
considered wildly divergent points of view and competing concerns of
employees, prospective employees, and employers; students, prospective
students, and educational institutions; law enforcement; regulatory agencies;
privacy advocates; trade associations; academics; and other interested
232
individuals and entities.
The pursuit of the Drafting Committee was to
prepare a thoughtful, balanced, and workable act that will be enacted in the
various states, and an eye on enactability was certainly a key component in the
work. As a result, UESOPPA does not take extreme positions; rather, the Act
takes a balanced approach, providing protection for employees and students
while ensuring those protections are not so strident that they leave employers
and educational institutions powerless to take action to ensure public safety,
safety in the workplace and school contexts, and also protect their own rights.
The hope, as with any new act, is that UESOPPA will offer needed clarity,
uniformity, predictability, and fairness and will be enacted broadly.
V. OVERVIEW OF UESOPPA

UESOPPA is, quite intentionally, a very short act. The text of UESOPPA
contains less than 2,200 words and, single-spaced, easily fits on five pages.
Even double-spaced and with a detailed prefatory note and comments,
233
UESOPPA is seventeen pages long. Although containing ten sections, the

229. See ABA HOD Approves Five Uniform Acts, supranote 186.
230. FrequentlyAsked Questions, supranote 9.
231. Employee and Student Online Privacy Protection Act, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Employee%20and%20Student%200nline%20Privacy%/20
Protection%20Act (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
232. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AM EmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
233. The approved final text of UESOPPA, with prefatory note and comments, as well as
additional information about the ULC, appears as Appendix A to this Article. See infraapp. A. By
way of comparison, other acts that have been widely adopted are far longer. Compare UNIF. EMP.
& STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT § § 1-10 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2016) (seventeen pages with prefatory note and comments), with UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-11 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
1968) (sixty-four pages with prefatory note and comments), UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
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key provisions of UESOPPA appear in four of those sections, starting with
definitions.
A.

PrefatoryNote

In a page and a half, the UESOPPA Prefatory Note summarizes the
pervasive use of online accounts and related privacy issues and legislative
responses and provides an overview of the Act.234 The Prefatory Note provides

a helpful introduction to the specific provisions of UESOPPA and, although
providing a lengthy quote, is provided here in its entirety:
Today, most individuals have online accounts of some type. These
include social media accounts, bank accounts, and email accounts,
among others. Generally, when someone asks for access to the login
information for, or content of, a personal online account, an individual
is free to say "no." But that is less true in the employment and
educational contexts. Employers may have the power to coerce access
to personal online accounts of individuals who are, or seek to become,
their employees. Similarly, educational institutions may have coercive
power over those who are, or seek to become, their students. When an
employer or educational institution asks for the login information for,
or content of, an employee's or student's online account, that person
may find it difficult to refuse. In recent years, there have been a
number of reports of incidents where employers and educational
institutions have demanded, and received, such access.
This has led a number of states to consider or pass legislation
protecting employee and student privacy with respect to their personal
online accounts. See http://www.ncsl.org/research/ telecomm
unications-and-information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-accessto-social-media-usemames-and-passwords.aspx (last visited August
24, 2016). These acts and bills vary widely. For example, some protect
only employees, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40x, some protect
only students, see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC., § 26-40 1, and some

& ENF'T ACT §§ 101-405 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1997)
(seventy-three pages with prefatory note and comments), andUNIF. PROB. CODE § § 1.101-8.102
(NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2008) (803 pages with prefatory note
and comments).
234. UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONHNE PRIVACY PROT. ACT comnittee's prefatorynote at 1-2
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social%20media%

20privacy/ESOPPAFinal%2OAct 2016.pdf
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protect both employees and students, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §
37.271-37.278. Some protect only social networking accounts, see,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709A, while others cover additional
login-protected personal online accounts such as email or messaging
accounts, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-56-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 3448-102. Some of the education-related bills and acts limit themselves
to post-secondary schools, see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC., § 26-401,
while others extend protections as early as kindergarten, see, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.272. The existing bills and acts also differ in
other, important ways. This creates a need for greater uniformity and
consistency in state approaches to this issue.
The Uniform Employee and Student Online Privacy Protection Act
(UESOPPA) provides a model for states to adopt. Its principal goal is
to enable employees and students to make choices about whether, and
when, to provide employers and educational institutions with access to
their personal online accounts. To this end, the Act prohibits
employers and educational institutions from requiring, coercing, or
requesting that employees or students provide them with access to the
login information for, or content of, these accounts. It further prohibits
employers and educational institutions from requiring or coercing an
employee or student to add them to the list of those given access to the
account (to "friend" them, in common parlance), though it does not
prohibit them from requestingto be added to such a list.
Employee and student privacy interests extend, not only to their social
networking accounts, but also to their email, messaging, financial, and
other login-protected online accounts. UESOPPA accordingly adopts
the approach of those jurisdictions whose statutes cover this broader
ground. The term "protected personal online account" defines this
broader scope. It also sets some important limits on it. As the term
makes clear, the act governs only "online" accounts and does not cover
those accounts that are not accessed by means of a computer network
or the Internet. The Act governs accounts that are "protected" by a
login requirement and does not cover employee or student online
accounts, or those portions thereof, which are publicly available. The
Act governs "personal" online accounts and does not cover those that
the employer or educational institution supplies or pays for in full, or
that the employee or student creates or uses primarily on behalf of or
under the direction of the employer or educational institution, so long
as the employer or educational institution has notified the employee or
student that it might request the login information for, or content of,
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such an account. The terms "online," "protected," and "personal" thus
go a long way toward defining the scope of the Act.
UESOPPA seeks to bolster individual choice. It therefore allows
employees and students voluntarily to share non-public "protected
personal online account" content and login information with their
employers or educational institutions, should they choose to do so.
UESOPPA is divided into 10 sections. Section 1 is the short title.
Section 2 defines important terms used in the Act. Section 3 delineates
protections for employee protected personal online accounts and
creates exceptions to these protections. Section 4 delineates
protections for student protected personal online accounts and creates
exceptions to these protections. Section 5 provides remedies for
violations of the Act, including a private right of action. The
remainder of the Act contains provisions generally included by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
Uniform Acts. Section 6 contains a uniformity of application and
construction provision. Section 7 modifies portions of the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. Section 8 is a
suggested severability provision. Section 9 is a placeholder provision
should enactment in any given state repeal or require conforming
235
amendments to other law. Section 10 is an effective date provision.
With this overview, the following discussion gives a more detailed
overview of UESOPPA.236
B. Definitions
1.

"ProtectedPersonalOnline Account"
237

Section 2 of UESOPPA contains the definitions.
A cornerstone of
UESOPPA is the "protected personal online account" concept, which is defined
as follows:

2 3 5. Id.
236. See Barbara Atwood, Tim Berg & Sam Thumma, UniformLaw CommissionAddresses
Arbitration, Online Privacy, More, 53 ARIZ. ATT'Y 32, 37-42 (Nov. 2016) (providing a brief
overview of UESOPPA).
237. UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT § 2.
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"Protected personal online account" means an employee's or student's
online account that is protected by a login requirement. The term does
not include an online account or the part of an online account:
(A) that is publicly available; or
(B) that the employer or educational institution has notified the
employee or student might be subject to a request for login
information or content, and which:
(i)

the employer or educational institution supplies or pays
for in full; or

(ii)

the employee or student creates, maintains, or uses
primarily on behalf of or under the direction of the
employer or educational institution in connection with
the employee's employment or the student's education.238

There is a good deal to this definition of "protected personal online
account." Working through the definition, by referencing other defined terms,
is the best way to further illuminate both the meaning of the first sentence
(which defines the outer limits of the phrase) and then the remainder of the
definition (which limits the meaning of the phrase). The best place to start is
with who is protected ("employee" and "student") and the corresponding
definitions of "employer" and "educational institution."
2.

"Employee" and "Employer"

"Employee" is broadly defined as "an individual who provides services or
labor to an employer in exchange for salary, wages, or the equivalent or, for an
unpaid intern, academic credit or occupational experience." 239 The drafting
process made plain that the definition of "employee" can vary greatly
depending upon the context. This definition was designed to focus on the nature
of the relationship and whether coercion might be used to gain access to a
protected personal online account, not merely whether money was provided for
services or labor performed. Accordingly, the definition does not require
payment for services or labor performed, but it expressly includes relationships
where the individual providing the services or labor was given academic credit,

238. Id § 2(10) at 4.
239. Id § 2(4) at 3.
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occupational experience, or otherwise (including an unpaid intern) even though
240
no money changed hands.
The definition of "employee" goes even further to include a prospective
employee who "has expressed to the employer an interest in being an
employee" or "has applied for or is applying for employment by, or is being
recruited for employment by, the employer." 241 The term also expressly
includes "an independent contractor." 242
In sum, employee includes an individual providing services or labor in
exchange for money, academic credit, or occupational experience, and an
individual who has expressed to the employer an interest in becoming an
employee, who has applied or is applying for such employment, or is being
recruited by the employer, and also includes an independent contractor. As
explained in the Comment discussing the definition, this breadth was
intentional and was designed to account for potentially coercive relationships:
The definition of "employee" includes not only full-time employees
but also part-time employees, independent contractors, unpaid interns,
and prospective employees. An employer may have coercive power
over each of these categories of individuals. The Act accordingly
applies to them all. The Act applies to prospective employees, where
no employer-employee relationship has yet been created nor
compensation paid, since employers can hold significant leverage over
those who wish to work for them. This important addition creates a
risk of overbreadth since, in some sense, any individual is a
"prospective employee" of any given employer. To address this, the
Act covers only a prospective employee who has "expressed to the
employer an interest in being an employee of the employer, has
applied to or is applying to, or is being recruited by, the employer."
This limitation narrows the field to those individuals with respect to
243
whom the employer is likely to hold significant coercive power.
UESOPPA relies on this broad definition of "employee" to define, in a
mirror image fashion, "employer." "'Employer' means a person that provides
salary, wages, or the equivalent in exchange for services or labor or engages the
services or labor of an unpaid intern. The term includes an agent or designee of
244
the employer."

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id
Id
Id
Id § 2 cmt. at 6.
Id § 2(8) at 3-4.
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"Student" and "EducationalInstitution"

"Student" similarly is broadly defined as "an individual who participates in
an educational institution's organized program of study or training."245 Akin to
the definition of "employee," the definition of "student" includes "a prospective
student who expresses to the institution an interest in being admitted to, applies
for admission to, or is being recruited for admission by, the educational
institution.'246 Recognizing that some students may be minors, the term also
247
includes "a parent or legal guardian of a student under the age of" majority.
The corresponding Comment discusses some of the similarities and differences
between the definition of "student" and "employee":
The definition of "student" faces the same overbreadth issue as the
definition of employee. Virtually any individual could be viewed as a
"prospective student" of a given educational institution. To address
this, the definition treats as a prospective student only an individual
that "expresses an interest in being admitted to, applies for admission
to, or is being recruited by, the educational institution." This limitation
narrows the field to those individuals with respect to whom the
educational institution is likely to hold significant coercive power.
Because some students are minors, the definition of "student" includes
"a parent or guardian" of a minor student so that these parents and
guardians and their minor students have the same protections as
241
students who have reached the age of majority.
Unlike the definition of "employer," the definition of "educational
249
institution" limits the universe of schools subject to UESOPPA.
"'Educational institution' means a person that provides students at the
postsecondary level an organized program of study or training which is
academic, technical, trade-oriented, or preparatory for gaining employment and
for which the person gives academic credit." 250 The term includes public and
251
private institutions and an agent or designee of the educational institution.
The import of this definition is that, for educational institutions and students,

245. Id § 2(14) at 5.
246. Id
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id
Id § 2 cmt. at 6-7.
Id
Id § 2(2).
Id § 2(2)(A)-(B).
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UESOPPA applies only in the postsecondary level (and not to primary or
252
secondary schools).
Whether UESOPPA should apply to primary or secondary schools was
discussed by the Drafting Committee throughout the drafting process and
expressly raised when the drafts were considered at the 2015 and 2016 ULC
253
Annual Meetings. As explained in the Comment discussing the definition,
the limitation to postsecondary schools "is consistent with the majority of
existing state laws."254 As noted by the Drafting Committee in advance of the
draft being considered at the 2016 ULC Annual Meeting, this line of
demarcation also reflects the greater responsibility that primary and secondary
255
schools have for the welfare of their students. And although not expressly
stated in UESOPPA, from an enactability perspective, in at least some
jurisdictions, issues of local control by school boards may be a powerful force
with strong resistance to legislation that would diminish that local control.256
4.

"Online," "Login Requirement, " and "Login Information"

The other defined terms implicated by the first sentence of "protected
personal online account" include "online," "login requirement," and, as a
consequence, "login information."257

"'Online' means accessibility by means of a computer network or the
Internet." 258 Although broad, this definition is significant for what it does not
include. As explained in the Comment, the "online" definition "does not
include an individual's computer, or those portions thereof, that are not
connected to a computer network or the Internet. Other statutes, such as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, offer some protection in

252. Id § 2 cmt. at 5.
253. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 3 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AMEmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf.
254. UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT § 2 cmt. at 5.
255. Memorandum from Samuel A. Thumma and Dennis D. Hirsch to Committee of the
Whole, UNIF. LAW COMM'N 3 (June 10, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/social
%20media%20privacy/2016AMEmplStudentOnlinePrivProtectIssues%20memo.pdf;
cf
Boisson v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 343 P.3d 931, 934-35 (Ariz. App. 2015) (discussing duty in the
context of the student-school relationship in primary, secondary, and college and university
contexts, noting in the primary and secondary school context, "the relationship is custodial").
256. Cf Tiffani N. Darden, Parental Exclusion from the Education Governance
Kaleidoscope:Providinga Political Voicefor MarginalizedStudents in our Time ofDisruption,
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1093, 1122 (2014) ("School board politics unearth controversial
debates surrounding local control, resources, and community participation.").
257. See UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT § 2(10) at 4.
258. Id § 2(8) at 4.
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such cases." 25 9 A key point is that a stand-alone computer, not connected to a
computer network or the Internet, does not fall within the definition of"online"
and, accordingly, falls outside the scope of UESOPPA. 260
"Login requirement" is a transitional phrase which "means a requirement
that login information be provided before an online account or electronic device
can be accessed or controlled." 26 1"Login information," in turn, "means a user
name and password, password, or other means or credentials of authentication
required to access or control" either a protected personal online account or an
electronic device "which the employee's employer or student's educational
institution has not supplied or paid for in full, that itself provides access to or
control over the account."262 As explained in the Comment, this broad
definition is designed to account for future changes in technology:
The definition of "login information" refers not only to passwords and
usernames but also to any "other means or credentials of
authentication" required to control or gain access to an online account.
This broad, technology-neutral language can adapt to emerging
methods of authentication such as bio-metric identification. The
definition recognizes that some individuals stay logged into their
personal accounts on their personal devices. It therefore includes login
information for "an electronic device .

.

. which itself provides access

to or control over a protected personal online account." 263
Rounding out the definitions unique to UESOPPA, "content" is defined as
"information, other than login information, that is contained in a protected
personal online account, accessible to the account holder, and not publicly
available."

264

265
"'Publicly available' means available to the general public."

The key aspect of these definitions is they make plain that UESOPPA applies to
266
restrict access only to non-publicly available information.
As noted in the
Comment,
[t]he definition of "content" includes those portions of an individual's
protected personal online account that the account holder has access to

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id § 2 cmt. at 6.
See id.
Id § 2(7) at 4.
Id § 2(6) at 4.
Id § 2 cmt. at 6.
Id § 2(1) at 3.
Id § 2(11) at 5.
Id § 2 cmt. at 5.
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and could turn over to an employer or educational institution. It thus
corresponds to [UESOPPA's] ... core purpose which is to protect
employees and students against coercive demands and requests. The
definition makes clear that [UESOPPA] does not prohibit employers
or educational institutions from accessing publicly available
267
information.
UESOPPA also includes standard definitions for "electronic," 268
269
27,271
person,"
"record,"27 0 and "state,
which are used by the ULC for all acts
272
when applicable and are not unique to UESOPPA.
C. Protections and Exceptions
With these definitions in hand, what does UESOPPA prohibit, require, do,
and not do? The Act has two parallel sections. Section 3 addresses employees
273
and employers,
and Section 4 addresses students and educational
274
institutions.
These sections contain similar prohibitions and requirements,
275
although tailored to reflect the differences in employment and education.
Stated simply, these sections are divided into four subsections:
* Subsection (a) prohibits an employer or educational institution
from taking certain actions that would compromise the privacy of
an employee's or student's protected personal online account;
* Subsection (b) creates exceptions to the prohibitions in Subsection
(a);
* Subsection (c) provides additional protections and limitations if an
employer or educational institution accesses content in a protected
personal online account for a purpose specified in Subsection
(b)(3); and
* Subsection (d) provides additional protections when an employer
or educational institution, by operation of lawful monitoring
technology, obtains login information for an employee's or
276
student's protected personal online account.

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

§ 2(3) at 3.
§ 2(9) at 4.
§ 2(12) at 5.
§ 2(13) at 5.
§ 2 cmt. at 7.
§ 3 at 7.
§ 4 at 11.
3 at 7-9; id. 4 at 11-13.
cmt. at 9; id. § 4 cmt. at 13.

§3
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Each of these four subsections merit a closer look.
1.

Prohibitions

Subject to exceptions discussed in the next subsection, UESOPPA contains
two types of prohibitions: (1) prohibiting an employer or educational institution
from requiring, coercing, or requesting an employee or student to make login
information or content of a protected personal online account available to the
employer or educational institution; and (2) prohibiting an employer or
educational institution from taking adverse action against an employee or
student for failing to comply with a prohibited requirement or request.277
Starting with the first category, UESOPPA provides that an employer or an
educational institution may not "require, coerce, or request" an employee or
student to (1) disclose login information for a protected personal online
account; (2) disclose the content of a protected personal online account
("except that an employer [or educational institution] may request an employee
[or student] to add the employer [or educational institution] to, or not remove
the employer [or educational institution] from, the set of persons to which the
employee [or student] grants access to the content"); (3) alter the settings of the
protected personal online account so that login information, or content of, the
account is "more accessible to others"; or (4) access the account in the presence
of the employee [or student] that allows the employer [or educational
institution] to see the login information for or content of the protected personal
online account.278
As stated in the Comment in the employment context and echoed in the
Comment in the educational institution context, these prohibitions mean
that an employer may not require, coerce, or request that the employee
provide it with access to login information or content. However, it
allows an employer to request (though not to require or coerce) that the
employee add it to the list of persons to whom the employee grants
access to the account (to "friend" them, in common parlance). The
intent is to balance the need to protect employees against coercion
with employees' understandable interest in forming social connections
279
with one another and with their employer.

277. Id § 3(a)(2)(A) at 7; id. § 4(a)(2)(A) at 11-12.
278. Id § 3(a)(1) at 7; id § 4(a)(1) at 11.
279. Id § 3 cmt. at 9-10; see id § 4 cmt. at 13 ("The comments that follow Section 3 apply
equally to Section 4, with the exception that 'student' should be substituted for 'employee,' and
'educational institution' for 'employer."').
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The ability of an employer or educational institution to request to be added
as a "friend" was designed, among other things, to allow individuals whose
creative efforts were resident in a protected personal online account to share
that information with an actual or prospective employer or educational
institution. For example, absent this exception, it is uncertain whether a design
company or educational institution could ask an applicant to provide access to
non-public information resident on an applicant's protected personal online
account containing the applicant's creative portfolio. The non-coercive personal
choice to decide whether to share such information is a key aspect of the
privacy rights UESOPPA is designed to protect.280
UESOPPA next provides that an employer or educational institution may
not "take, or threaten to take, adverse action" against an employee or student
for failing to comply with a requirement, coercive action, or request that
violates these prohibitions, or for failing to comply with a request to add the
employer or educational institution to, or not remove it from, those persons the
employee or student grants access to the content of a protected personal online
account.21 The reason for this category of prohibitions is to ensure that all
prohibitions have meaning. As crisply stated in the Comment, "[t]his ensures
that, even with respect to a request to be added to the list of contacts, the
employee [or student] retains the ability to say 'no' without fear of reprisal."282
2.

Exceptions to the Prohibitions

The prohibitions are subject to certain enumerated exceptions.28 The
exceptions, however, simply provide that nothing in the prohibitions "shall
prevent an employer [or educational institution] from" doing certain
284
enumerated things.
Critically, these exceptions do not authorize such
enumerated things but, instead, simply state that the prohibitions do not prohibit
285
the actions described in the enumerated exceptions.
This limitation is
designed to prevent any confusion about whether UESOPPA authorizes actions
286
described in the enumerated exceptions. As the Comment makes plain,
[t]he subsection 3(b) exceptions limit the scope of the subsection 3(a)
prohibitions. They do not create affirmative rights. Thus, if a 3(b)

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. prefatory note at 1.
Id § 3(a)(2) at 7; id § 4(a)(2) at 11-12.
Id § 3 cmt. at 10; see id § 4 cmt. at 13.
See id. § 3(b) at 8; id. § 4(b) at 12.
Id
See id. § 3 cmt. at 10.
See id.
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exception were to lift the 3(a) prohibitions with respect to a particular
employer action, but another law (e.g., the Fourth Amendment) were
to forbid such employer action, the action in question would remain
illegal under that other law. The subsection 3(b) exceptions function
solely to limit the subsection 3(a) prohibitions. They do not affect
other federal or state laws that also may prohibit the actions in
question and, instead, would require reference to other law to
determine if such actions are lawful.287
With that essential caveat, these exceptions fall into three categories.
First, the prohibitions do not prevent an employer or educational institution
from "accessing information about an employee [or student] which is publicly
available." 288 This exception is consistent with the focus of UESOPPA,
including the definitions of "protected personal online account" and "content,"
which is to protect information that is "not publicly available." 289
Second, the prohibitions do not prevent an employer or educational
institution from "complying with a federal or state law, court order, or rule of a
self-regulatory organization established by federal or state statute," and for an
employer (but not an educational institution), "including a self-regulatory
organization defined in Section 3(a)(26) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26)." 290 This exception recognizes the supremacy of
federal law as well as the need to comply with other aspects of state law and
court orders.
The Comment to this exception focuses on self-regulatory organizations
291
both in the employment and educational institution contexts.
In the
employment context, the Comment states:
The principal self-regulatory organizations intended here are those
defined [in] the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(26). These self-regulatory organizations must access certain
employee online account information in order to fulfill their
obligations to prevent market fraud and manipulation. The Act

287. Id § 3 cmt. at 10-11; accordid. § 4 cmt. at 13-14 ("The comments that follow Section
3 apply equally to Section 4, with the exception that 'student' should be substituted for
'employee,' and 'educational institution' for 'employer."').
288. Id § 3(b)(1) at 8; id § 4(b)(1) at 12.
289. Id §2(1) at 3; id §2(10) at 4; see id. prefatory note at 2.
290. Id § 3(b)(2) at 8; id § 4(b)(2) at 12.
291. Id § 3 cmt. at 10; see id § 4 cmt. at 14 ("The comments that follow Section 3 apply
equally to Section 4, with the exception that 'student' should be substituted for 'employee,' and
'educational institution' for 'employer."').
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exempts them so that they can perform this vital role. This exception is
a narrow one. It is intended to apply only to self-regulatory
organizations, like those identified in the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, that are established by a federal or state statute. It is not
intended to encompass a self-regulatory organization that an industry
292
group or sector establishes absent such statutory recognition.
In the educational institution context, the Comment states:
Subsection 4(b)(2) creates an exception for educational institution
compliance with the rules of self-regulatory organizations established
by federal or state statute. This exception is intended to apply only to
self-regulatory organizations that a federal and state statute recognizes
in the way that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(26), recognizes self-regulatory organizations for certain
employers. It is not intended to encompass a self-regulatory
organization that an educational group or sector establishes absent
such statutory recognition.293
These Comments make plain that this exception is limited and is not
intended to apply to regulations or guidelines established by self-regulatory
organizations that are not established by federal or state statute.294 This prevents

employers or educational institutions from establishing a self-regulatory
organization without statutory authorization to promulgate a rule that would
295
negate the protections in UESOPPA.
Third, the prohibitions do not prevent an employer or educational
institution from "requiring or requesting, based on specific facts about the
employee's [or student's] protected personal online account, access to the
content of, but not the login information for, the account in order to" undertake
certain defined investigations or protection.296 The limitations hard-wired into
this third exception are intentionally substantial.
This exception requires "specific facts," not mere general facts or
297
allegations.
The "specific facts" must be about the employee's or student's
"protected personal online account," 298 not about issues unrelated to such an

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id § 3 cmt. at 10.
Id § 4 cmt. at 14 (emphasis added).
Id § 3 cmt. at 10; id. § 4 at 14.
See id.
Id § 3(b)(3) at 8; id § 4(b)(3) at 12.
See id.
Id
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account. And the exception expressly does not allow access to "the login
299
information for" the protected personal online account. Indeed, nowhere does
UESOPPA allow an employer or educational institution to compel the
production of login information for an employee's or student's protected
personal online account. 300
Based on specific facts about an employee's or student's protected personal
online account, an employer or educational institution may require or request
access to the content of an employee's or student's protected personal online
account to "ensure compliance, or investigate non-compliance, with . .. federal
or state law." 301 This exception is consistent with the exception allowing an
employer or educational institution to comply with federal or state law, by
allowing (based on specific facts about the relevant protected personal online
account) to take action to comply with, and investigate non-compliance with,
such law.302
Based on specific facts about an employee's or student's protected personal
online account (as applicable), access to an employee's or student's protected
personal online account may be required or requested:
* by an employer to "ensure compliance, or investigate noncompliance, with ... an employer prohibition against workrelated employee misconduct of which the employee has
reasonable notice, which is in a record, and which was not created
primarily to gain access to a protected personal online account"
or,
* by an educational institution to "ensure compliance, or investigate
noncompliance, with ... an educational institution prohibition
against education-related student misconduct of which the student
has reasonable notice, which is in a record, and which was not

299. Id
300. See id. prefatory note at 1-2, §§ 1-10 at 3-17.
301. Id § 3(b)(3)(A)(i) at 8; id. § 4(b)(3)(A)(i) at 12.
302. Compare id. § 3(b)(3)(A)(i) at 8 (allowing employer to require or request access to
content of the employee's protected personal online account in order to "ensure compliance, or
investigate non-compliance" with state or federal law, when such request or requirement is, based
on certain facts relating to that account), and id. § 4(b)(3)(A)(i) at 12 (allowing educational
institution to require or request access to content of the student's protected personal online account
in order to "ensure compliance, or investigate non-compliance" with state or federal law, when
such request or requirement is, based on certain facts relating to that account), with id. § 3(b)(2) at
8 (stating prohibitions in subsection (a) do not prevent an employer from complying with state or
federal law), and id § 4(b)(2) at 12 (stating prohibitions in subsection (a) do not prevent an
educational institution from complying with state or federal law).
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created primarily to gain access to a protected personal online
account." 303

Again, these provisions contain substantial limitations, including that the
prohibition for which compliance is being investigated must be (1) an employer
or educational institution prohibition; (2) against employee or student
misconduct; (3) of which the employee or student has reasonable notice; (4) in
a record; and (5) which is "not created primarily to gain access to a protected
personal online account." 304 As noted in the Comment applicable in both the
employer and educational institution contexts,
[t]his is intended to be a narrow exception. As the Act makes clear, it
applies only where: an employer bases its demand or request on
"specific facts about the employee's protected personal online
account;" the employer policy is in a record of which the employee
had advance notice; the employer policy concerns "work-related
employee misconduct;" and the employer created the policy for a bona
fide business purpose and not primarily as a justification for accessing
protected employee online content. These conditions are intended to
ensure that the exception is used only for good faith investigations into
work-related employee misconduct, and not to undermine the Act's
305
prohibitions absent compliance with this narrow exception.
Finally, based on specific facts about an employee's or student's protected
personal online account (as applicable), access to that account may be required
or requested by an employer or educational institution to "protect against: (i) a
threat to safety; (ii) a threat to employer [or educational institution] information
technology or communications technology systems or to employer [or
educational institution] property; or (iii) disclosure of information in which the
employer [or educational institution] has a proprietary interest or information
the employer [or educational institution] has a legal obligation to keep
confidential." 306 These are limited exceptions to the protections ofUESOPPA,
which require specific facts about the relevant protected personal online
account, and even then, allow access to the content of (but not login
information for) the account to protect against a threat to safety, information

303. See UNIF. EMP. & STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROT. ACT

§ 3(b)(3)(A)(ii)

at 8; id.

§

4(b)(3)(A)(ii) at 12.
304. Id
305. Id § 3 cmt. at 10; see id. § 4 cmt. at 13 ("The comments that follow Section 3 apply
equally to Section 4, with the exception that 'student' should be substituted for 'employee,' and
'educational institution' for 'employer."').
306. Id § 3(b)(3)(B) at 8; id. § 4(b)(3)(B) at 12.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/3

54

Thumma: When You Cannot Just Say No: Protecting the Online Privacy of Emp
WHEN YOU CANNOT "JUST SAY No"

2017]

55

technology or communications system, employer or educational institution
property, or disclosure of proprietary information or information the employer
or educational institution has a legal duty to keep confidential.307
3.

Use of Content

Along with the restrictions on how an employer or educational institution
may require or request access to content in this third category, UESOPPA
contains important limitations on the use of such information if it is accessed.308
This limitation on use provides additional protections if an employer or
educational institution properly accesses content in a protected personal online
account for a purpose specified in Subsection (b)(3) of the Act. 309 Those
limitations are that an employer or educational institution that accesses content
for such a purpose: "(1) shall attempt reasonably to limit its access to content
that is relevant to the specified purpose; (2) shall use the content only for the
specified purpose; and (3) may not alter the content unless necessary to achieve
the specified purpose."310 As noted in the Comment, again applicable in both
the employer and educational institution contexts,

'

[s]ubsection 3(c) clarifies that, even where the subsection 3(b)(3)
exception applies, it does not give employers carte blanche to access or
alter the content of the employee's protected account. Instead,
subsection 3(c) requires an employer utilizing the exception to
reasonably attempt to limit its access to content that is relevant to the
purpose that justified the exception, use the content only for this
purpose, and refrain from altering content.3 1
4.

Use ofLogin Information

The final restriction set forth in UESOPPA applies when an employer or
educational institution acquires login information for a "protected personal
online account by means of otherwise lawful technology that monitors the
employer's [or educational institution's] network, or employer- [or educational
institution-] provided devices, for a network security, data confidentiality, or

307. Id
308. Id §3 at 7-9; id.

4 at 11-13.

309. See id
310. Id § 3(c) at 8-9; id § 4(c) at 13.
311. Id § 3 cmt. at 11; see id § 4 cmt. at 13 ("The comments that follow Section 3 apply
equally to Section 4, with the exception that 'student' should be substituted for 'employee,' and
'educational institution' for 'employer."').

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

55

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
56

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 1

system maintenance purpose." 312 In that event where an employer or
educational institution has obtained login information through lawful
monitoring technology UESOPPA provides four additional protections
regarding that login information.313 Specifically, the employer or educational
institution:
(1) may not use the login information to access or enable another
person to access the account;
(2) shall make a reasonable effort to keep the login information secure;
(3) unless otherwise provided in paragraph (4), shall dispose of the
login information as soon as, as securely as, and to the extent
reasonably practicable; and
(4) shall, if the employer [or educational institution] retains the login
information for use in an ongoing investigation of an actual or
suspected breach of computer, network, or data security, make a
reasonable effort to keep the login information secure and dispose of it
as soon as, as securely as, and to the extent reasonably practicable after
completing the investigation.3 14
As reflected in the Comment, this further limitation
takes account of the fact that employers [and educational institutions],
in conducting information and communications system monitoring
required for maintenance and cybersecurity, may inadvertently gain
access to login information for an employee's [or student's] protected
personal online account. It makes clear that, while such capture of
login information does not, in itself, violate [UESOPPA], employers
[and educational institutions] must exercise care with respect to such
information. They should take reasonable steps to secure the login
information and should dispose of it as soon and as securely as is
reasonably practicable.3 15

312. Id § 3(d) at 9; id § 4(d) at 13.
313. Id § 3(d)(1)-(4) at 9; id § 4(d)(1)-(4) at 13.
314. Id
315. Id § 3 cmt. at 11; see id § 4 cmt. at 13 ("The comments that follow Section 3 apply
equally to Section 4, with the exception that 'student' should be substituted for 'employee,' and
'educational institution' for 'employer."').
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D. Enforcement Provisions
UESOPPA expressly provides that civil actions may be brought either by
an appropriate governmental enforcement agency (presumptively, the relevant
state's attorney general) or by the employee or student harmed by a violation of
the Act. 316 These actions are not mutually exclusive, and both can be brought

for the same violation.317 Similarly, UESOPPA "does not effect a right or
remedy available under law other than" the Act, meaning other statutory or
common law claims could be asserted along with a claim for a violation of the
Act.

3 18

The available remedies under UESOPPA depend upon whether the action
is brought by an appropriate governmental enforcement agency or by an
employee or student. 319 A prevailing governmental enforcement agency "may
obtain[: (1)] injunctive and other equitable relief [; and (2) a civil penalty of up
to $[1,000] for each violation but not exceeding $[100,000] for all violations
caused by the same event] .,,320 As explained in the Comment, by bracketing the
monetary amounts, this provision
gives an enacting state the option to define a maximum civil penalty
for each violation, and a maximum civil penalty for all violations
caused by the same act. The cap on the total penalty for all violations
caused by a single act is intended to prevent civil penalties from
escalating to disproportionate levels. For example, absent such a cap,
where a state set the maximum civil penalty per violation at $1000, an
employer that sent an e-mail to 1000 employees requesting the login
information for, or content of, their protected online accounts in
violation of the act would face a penalty of up to $1,000,000 for this
single act. [This provision] is intended to avoid such disproportionate
penalties by capping the maximum civil penalty for all violations
caused by the same act at a level that the enacting state deems
321
appropriate.

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id § 5(a)-(b) at 14.
See id § 5(c) at 14.
Id § 5(d) at 14; see id § 5 cmt. at 15.
Id § 5(a)-(b) at 14.
Id § 5(a) at 14.
Id § 5 cmt. at 14-15; accord id § 5 legislative note at 14.
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The brackets surrounding the monetary penalty language (the second
alternative) allow states to authorize the appropriate governmental enforcement
agency to seek only injunctive or equitable relief (but not a civil penalty).322
For private civil litigation, UESOPPA provides that a prevailing employee
or student may obtain against the relevant employer or educational institution
"(1) injunctive or other equitable relief; (2) actual damages; and (3) costs and
reasonable attorney's fees." 323 To avoid any uncertainty, the Comment provides
that this provision "establishes a private right of action for employees and
students."324 "No mental state is specified for a cause of action" under the
Act.325 Finally, UESOPPA expressly states that it "does not affect a right or
326

remedy available under law other than" the Act.
E.

Other Guidance in UESOPPA

Along with the statutory text and corresponding Comments, UESOPPA
327
also includes Legislative Notes. In promulgating UESOPPA, the ULC sought
to provide protections, exceptions, and other guidance in the employeremployee context and the educational institution-student context.328 The ULC
promulgated UESOPPA "as an integrated whole" to be enacted by state
legislatures in both contexts.329 However, recognizing that some states have
enacted legislation in one of these contexts (but not both), the Legislative Notes
include a user's guide for states as to what sections of UESOPPA should be
enacted if a state "wishes to adopt only the employee provisions of the
UESOPPA" or "wishes to adopt only the student provisions of the
UESOPPA."3 30
VI. CONCLUSION
UESOPPA attempts to strike a delicate balance to protect and reflect
legitimate rights of employees and employers as well as students and
educational institutions. Using the "protected personal online account" concept
as the cornerstone, UESOPPA deals with similarly situated accounts similarly

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id § 5 legislative note at 14.
Id § 5(b) at 14.
Id § 5 cmt. at 15.
Id
Id § 5(d).
Id § 5 legislative note at 14; id. § 8 legislative note at 16; id.
Id prefatory note at 1-2.
See id. § 9 legislative note at 16.
Id
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and provides protection to true social media as well as more general (and more
pervasive) login-protected online accounts.
In substance, UESOPPA does four things: (1) provides specific protections
for protected personal online accounts held by employees and students against
coercive disclosure by employers and educational institutions; (2) provides
certain narrowly-tailored exceptions to those protections; (3) limits an
employer's or educational institution's use of information obtained from an
employee or student based on specific facts about that individual's protected
personal online account obtained to ensure compliance with or investigate noncompliance with law or to protect against a threat to safety or information or
proprietary interests; and (4) severely limits an employer's or educational
institution's use of login information for a protected personal online account if
obtained as a result of lawful monitoring.33' UESOPPA then provides civil
332
remedies for violations of these provisions.
UESOPPA provides consistency and uniformity, builds on the best of the
current state enactments, and avoids ambiguities and uncertainties. UESOPPA
provides a thoughtful balance of the issues and interests for all involved,
including protecting students and employees against coercive behavior.333
UESOPPA also provides employees and employers, as well as students and
educational institutions, much needed predictability and certainty for their
conduct, relationships, policies, and procedures. As UESOPPA gains
widespread acceptance, the current uncertainty and unpredictability that exists
because of significant variations in various state laws should abate. UESOPPA
can provide guidance for individuals, entities, and their representatives and add
certainty in their conduct, relationships, policies, and procedures. The hope is
that the states will recognize the need for uniformity in these areas, agree with
the policies reflected in UESOPPA, and enact it.

331. Id §3 at 7-9; id. 4 at 11-13.
332. Id § 5 at 14.
333. See id. prefatory note at 1-2.
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APPENDIX A

UNIFORM EMPLOYEE AND STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY
PROTECTIONACT

drafted by the
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

and by it
APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR ENACTMENT
IN ALL THE STATES

at its
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS ONE-HUNDRED-AND-TWENTY-FIFTH
STOWE, VERMONT
JULY 8 - JULY 14, 2016
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Copyright C 2016
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ABOUT ULC
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC), also known as National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), now in its 125th year, provides
states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.
ULC members must be lawyers, qualified to practice law. They are practicing
lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors, who have been
appointed by state governments as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands to research, draft and promote enactment of uniform
state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and practical.
*

ULC strengthens the federal system by providing rules and procedures that
are consistent from state to state but that also reflect the diverse experience
of the states.

*

ULC statutes are representative of state experience, because the
organization is made up of representatives from each state, appointed by
state government.

*

ULC keeps state law up-to-date by addressing important and timely legal
issues.

*

ULC's efforts reduce the need for individuals and businesses to deal with
different laws as they move and do business in different states.

*

ULC's work facilitates economic development and provides a legal
platform for foreign entities to deal with U.S. citizens and businesses.

*

Uniform Law Commissioners donate thousands of hours oftheir time and
legal and drafting expertise every year as a public service, and receive no
salary or compensation for their work.

*

ULC's deliberative and uniquely open drafting process draws on the
expertise of commissioners, but also utilizes input from legal experts, and
advisors and observers representing the views of other legal organizations
or interests that will be subject to the proposed laws.

*

ULC is a state-supported organization that represents true value for the
states, providing services that most states could not otherwise afford or
duplicate.
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UNIFORM EMPLOYEE AND STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT
The Committee appointed by and representing the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing this Act consists of the
following individuals:
SAMUEL A. THUMMA, Arizona Court of Appeals, State Courts Bldg., 1501 W.
Washington St., Phoenix, AZ 85007, Chair
JERRY L. BASSETT, Legislative Reference Service, 613 Alabama State House, 11
S. Union St., Montgomery, AL 36130
DIANE F. BOYER-VINE, Office of Legislative Counsel, State Capitol, Room
3021, Sacramento, CA 95814-4996
STEPHEN Y. CHOW, 125 Summer St., Boston, MA 02110-1624
BRIAN K. FLOWERS, 441 4th St. NW, Suite 830 South, Washington, DC 20001
WILLIAM H. HENNING, Texas A & M School of Law, 1515 Commerce St., Fort
Worth, TX 76102
LISA R. JACOBS, One Liberty Place, 1650 Market St., Suite 4900, Philadelphia,
PA 19103-7300
PETER F. LANGROCK, P.O. Drawer 351, 111 S. Pleasant St., Middlebury, VT
05753-1479
JAMES G. MANN, House Republican Legal Staff, Room B-6, Main Capitol Bldg.,
P.O. Box 202228, Harrisburg, PA 17120
ANN R. ROBINSON, 324 Gannett Dr., Suite 200, South Portland, ME 04106
STEVE WILBORN, 3428 Lyon Dr., Lexington, KY 40513
DENNIS D. HIRSCH, Capital University Law School, 303 E. Broad St., Columbus,
OH 43215, Reporter
EX OFFICIO
RICHARD T. CASSIDY, 100 Main St., P.O. Box 1124, Burlington, VT 05402,
President
JOHN T. MCGARVEY, 401 S. 4th St., Louisville, KY 40202, Division Chair
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORS
FRANK H. LANGROCK, P.O. Drawer 351, 111 S. Pleasant St., Middlebury, VT
05753-1479, ABA Advisor
PETER J. GILLESPIE, 1000 Marquette Bldg., 140 S. Dearborn St., Chicago,
IL 60603, ABA Section Advisor
HEATHER A. MORGAN, 515 S. Flower St., Suite 2500, Los Angeles, CA
90071-2228, ABA Section Advisor
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
LIZA KARSAI, 111 N. Wabash Ave., Suite 1010, Chicago, IL 60602, Executive
Director
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UNIFORM EMPLOYEE AND STUDENT ONLINE PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT
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PREFATORY NOTE
Today, most individuals have online accounts of some type. These include
social media accounts, bank accounts, and email accounts, among others.
Generally, when someone asks for access to the login information for, or
content of, a personal online account, an individual is free to say "no." But that
is less true in the employment and educational contexts. Employers may have
the power to coerce access to personal online accounts of individuals who are,
or seek to become, their employees. Similarly, educational institutions may
have coercive power over those who are, or seek to become, their students.
When an employer or educational institution asks for the login information for,
or content of, an employee's or student's online account, that person may find it
difficult to refuse. In recent years, there have been a number of reports of
incidents where employers and educational institutions have demanded, and
received, such access.
This has led a number of states to consider or pass legislation protecting
employee and student privacy with respect to their personal online accounts.
See http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-techn
ology/state-laws-prohibiting-access-to-social-media-usemames-and-password
s.aspx (last visited August 24, 2016). These acts and bills vary widely. For
example, some protect only employees, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40x,
some protect only students, see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC., § 26-40 1, and
some protect both employees and students, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §
37.271-37.278. Some protect only social networking accounts, see, e.g., DEL.
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CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709A, while others cover additional login-protected
personal online accounts such as email or messaging accounts, see, e.g., R.I.
GEN. LAWS

§ 28-56-1;

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 34-48-102. Some of the education-

related bills and acts limit themselves to post-secondary schools, see, e.g., MD.
CODE ANN., EDUC., § 26-401, while others extend protections as early as
kindergarten, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.272. The existing bills and
acts also differ in other, important ways. This creates a need for greater
uniformity and consistency in state approaches to this issue.
The Uniform Employee and Student Online Privacy Protection Act
(UESOPPA) provides a model for states to adopt. Its principal goal is to enable
employees and students to make choices about whether, and when, to provide
employers and educational institutions with access to their personal online
accounts. To this end, the act prohibits employers and educational institutions
from requiring, coercing, or requesting that employees or students provide them
with access to the login information for, or content of, these accounts. It further
prohibits employers and educational institutions from requiring or coercing an
employee or student to add them to the list of those given access to the account
(to "friend" them, in common parlance), though it does not prohibit them from
requestingto be added to such a list.
Employee and student privacy interests extend, not only to their social
networking accounts, but also to their email, messaging, financial, and other
login-protected online accounts. UESOPPA accordingly adopts the approach of
those jurisdictions whose statutes cover this broader ground. The term
"protected personal online account" defines this broader scope. It also sets
some important limits on it. As the term makes clear, the act governs only
"online" accounts and does not cover those accounts that are not accessed by
means of a computer network or the Internet. The act governs accounts that are
"protected" by a login requirement and does not cover employee or student
online accounts, or those portions thereof, which are publicly available. The
act governs "personal" online accounts and does not cover those that the
employer or educational institution supplies or pays for in full, or that the
employee or student creates or uses primarily on behalf of or under the
direction of the employer or educational institution, so long as the employer or
educational institution has notified the employee or student that it might request
the login information for, or content of, such an account. The terms "online,"
"protected," and "personal" thus go a long waytoward defining the scope ofthe
act.
UESOPPA seeks to bolster individual choice. It therefore allows
employees and students voluntarily to share non-public "protected personal
online account" content and login information with their employers or
educational institutions, should they choose to do so.
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UESOPPA is divided into 10 sections. Section 1 is the short title. Section
2 defines important terms used in the act. Section 3 delineates protections for
employee protected personal online accounts and creates exceptions to these
protections. Section 4 delineates protections for student protected personal
online accounts and creates exceptions to these protections. Section 5 provides
remedies for violations of the act, including a private right of action. The
remainder of the act contains provisions generally included by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in Uniform Acts.
Section 6 contains a uniformity of application and construction provision.
Section 7 modifies portions of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act. Section 8 is a suggested severability provision. Section 9 is a
placeholder provision should enactment in any given state repeal or require
conforming amendments to other law. Section 10 is an effective date provision.
UNIFORM EMPLOYEE AND STUDENT
ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform
Employee and Student Online Privacy Protection Act.
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:
(1) "Content" means information, other than login information, that is
contained in a protected personal online account, accessible to the account
holder, and not publicly available.
(2) "Educational institution" means a person that provides students at the
postsecondary level an organized program of study or training which is
academic, technical, trade-oriented, or preparatory for gaining employment
and for which the person gives academic credit. The term includes:
(A) a public or private institution; and
(B) an agent or designee of the educational institution.
(3) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital,
magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(4) "Employee" means an individual who provides services or labor to an
employer in exchange for salary, wages, or the equivalent or, for an unpaid
intern, academic credit or occupational experience. The term includes:
(A) a prospective employee who:
(i) has expressed to the employer an interest in being an
employee; or
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(ii) has applied to or is applying for employment by, or is
being recruited for employment by, the employer; and
(B) an independent contractor.
(5) "Employer" means a person that provides salary, wages, or the
equivalent to an employee in exchange for services or labor or engages the
services or labor of an unpaid intern. The term includes an agent or
designee of the employer.
(6) "Login information" means a user name and password, password, or
other means or credentials of authentication required to access or control:
(A) a protected personal online account; or
(B) an electronic device, which the employee's employer or the
student's educational institution has not supplied or paid for in full,
that itself provides access to or control over the account.
(7) "Login requirement" means a requirement that login information be
provided before an online account or electronic device can be accessed or
controlled.
(8) "Online" means accessible by means of a computer network or the Internet.
(9) "Person" means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, public
corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality, or other legal entity.
(10) "Protected personal online account" means an employee's or student's
online account that is protected by a login requirement. The term does not
include an online account or the part of an online account:
(A) that is publicly available; or
(B) that the employer or educational institution has notified the employee
or student might be subject to a request for login information or content,
and which:
(i) the employer or educational institution supplies or pays for in
full; or
(ii) the employee or student creates, maintains, or uses primarily
on behalf of or under the direction of the employer or
educational institution in connection with the employee's
employment or the student's education.
(11) "Publicly available" means available to the general public.
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(12) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or
that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form.
(13) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.
(14) "Student" means an individual who participates in an educational
institution's organized program of study or training. The term includes:
(A) a prospective student who expresses to the institution an interest in
being admitted to, applies for admission to, or is being recruited for
admission by, the educational institution; and
(B) a parent or legal guardian of a student under the age of [majority].
Legislative Note: A state should insert the appropriateage ofmajority in place of
the bracketedmaterial in paragraph(14) (B).

Comment
The definition of "content" includes those portions of an individual's protected
personal online account that the account holder has access to and could turn over to
an employer or educational institution. It thus corresponds to the act's core purpose
which is to protect employees and students against coercive demands and requests.
The definition makes clear that the act does not prohibit employers or educational
institutions from accessing publicly available information.
The definition of "educational institution" encompasses only post-secondary
educational institutions. This is consistent with the majority of existing state laws.

§ 99121; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 8102; MD. CODE
§ 26-401; UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-25-102. The term includes both

See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE

ANN., EDUC.,

public and private educational institutions. It further includes an agent or designee
of an educational institution such as a teacher, administrator, or coach. The
definition narrows the scope to those educational institutions that offer "an
organized program of study or training that is academic, technical, trade-oriented,
or preparatory for gaining employment" and that grant academic credit. This
limiting language excludes educational programs, such as a music school at which
the individual takes guitar lessons, that do not typically serve as gatekeepers to
degrees and employment and so are not in a position to coerce access to their
students' protected personal online accounts.
The definition of "employee" includes not only full-time employees but also
part-time employees, independent contractors, unpaid interns, and prospective
employees. An employer may have coercive power over each ofthese categories of
individuals. The act accordingly applies to them all. The act applies to prospective
employees, where no employer-employee relationship has yet been created nor
compensation paid, since employers can hold significant leverage over those who
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wish to work for them. This important addition creates a risk of overbreadth since,
in some sense, any individual is a "prospective employee" of any given employer.
To address this, the act covers only a prospective employee who has "expressed to
the employer an interest in being an employee of the employer, has applied to or is
applying to, or is being recruited by, the employer." This limitation narrows the
field to those individuals with respect to whom the employer is likely to hold
significant coercive power.
The definition of "employer" builds on the broad definition of employee and
includes an agent or designee of an employer such as a supervisor, manager, or
executive.
The definition of "login information" refers not only to passwords and
usernames but also to any "other means or credentials of authentication" required to
control or gain access to an online account. This broad, technology-neutral
language can adapt to emerging methods of authentication such as bio-metric
identification. The definition recognizes that some individuals stay logged into
their personal accounts on their personal devices. It therefore includes login
information for "an electronic device . . which itself provides access to or control
over a protected personal online account."
The definition of "online" includes accounts accessed "by means ofa computer
network or the Internet." It does not include an individual's computer, or those
portions thereof, that are not connected to a computer network or the Internet.
Other statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, offer
some protection in such contexts.
The definition of "protected personal online account" provides a roadmap for
determining whether a given account is covered by the act. The act governs only
those online accounts that are "protected" and does not cover employee or student
online accounts, or those portions thereof, which are publicly available. The act
governs only "personal" online accounts and does not cover those that the employer
or educational institution supplies or pays for in full, or that the employee or student
creates or uses primarily on behalf of or under the direction of the employer or
educational institution, so long as the employer or educational institution has
notified the employee or student that it might request the login information for or
content of such an account. The act governs only "online" accounts and does not
cover accounts that are not accessed by means of a computer network or the
Internet.
The definition of "student" faces the same overbreadth issue as the definition
of employee. Virtually any individual could be viewed as a "prospective student"
of a given educational institution. To address this, the definition treats as a
prospective student only an individual that "expresses an interest in being admitted
to, applies for admission to, or is being recruited by, the educational institution."
This limitation narrows the field to those individuals with respect to whom the
educational institution is likely to hold significant coercive power. Because some
students are minors, the definition of "student" includes "a parent or guardian" of a
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minor student so that these parents and guardians and their minor students have the
same protections as students who have reached the age of majority.
The definitions of "electronic," "person" and "record" are standard definitions
used by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and are
identical to those used in numerous other Uniform Acts.
SECTION 3. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE ONLINE ACCOUNT.
(a) Subject to the exceptions in subsection (b), an employer may not:
(1) require, coerce, or request an employee to:
(A) disclose the login information for a protected personal online
account;
(B) disclose the content of the account, except that an employer
may request an employee to add the employer to, or not remove
the employer from, the set of persons to which the employee
grants access to the content;
(C) alter the settings of the online account in a manner that
makes the login information for, or content of, the account more
accessible to others; or
(D) access the account in the presence of the employer in a
manner that enables the employer to observe the login
information for or content of the account; or
(2) take, or threaten to take, adverse action against an employee for failure
to comply with:
(A) an employer requirement, coercive action, or request that
violates paragraph (1); or
(B) an employer request under paragraph (1)(B) to add the
employer to, or not remove the employer from, the set ofpersons
to which the employee grants access to the content of a protected
personal online account.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall prevent an employer from:
(1) accessing information about an employee which is publicly available;
(2) complying with a federal or state law, court order, or rule of a selfregulatory organization established by federal or state statute, including a
self-regulatory organization defined in Section 3(a)(26) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26); or
(3) requiring or requesting, based on specific facts about the employee's
protected personal online account, access to the content of, but not the
login information for, the account in order to:
(A) ensure compliance, or investigate non-compliance, with:
(i) federal or state law; or
(ii) an employer prohibition against work-related
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employee misconduct of which the employee has
reasonable notice, which is in a record, and which was
not created primarily to gain access to a protected
personal online account; or
(B) protect against:
(i) a threat to safety;
(ii) a threat to employer information technology or
communications technology systems or to employer
property; or
(iii) disclosure of information in which the employer
has a proprietary interest or information the employer
has a legal obligation to keep confidential.
(c) An employer that accesses employee content for a purpose specified in
subsection (b)(3):
(1) shall attempt reasonably to limit its access to content that is relevant to
the specified purpose;
(2) shall use the content only for the specified purpose; and
(3) may not alter the content unless necessary to achieve the specified
purpose.
(d) An employer that acquires the login information for an employee's
protected personal online account by means of otherwise lawful technology
that monitors the employer's network, or employer-provided devices, for a
network security, data confidentiality, or system maintenance purpose:
(1) may not use the login information to access or enable another person
to access the account;
(2) shall make a reasonable effort to keep the login information secure;
(3) unless otherwise provided in paragraph (4), shall dispose of the login
information as soon as, as securely as, and to the extent reasonably
practicable; and
(4) shall, if the employer retains the login information for use in an
ongoing investigation of an actual or suspected breach of computer,
network, or data security, make a reasonable effort to keep the login
information secure and dispose of it as soon as, as securely as, and to the
extent reasonably practicable after completing the investigation.
Comment
Section 3 is divided into four subsections: subsection (a), which prohibits an
employer from taking certain actions that would compromise the privacy of an
employee's protected personal online account; subsection (b), which creates
exceptions to these prohibitions; subsection (c), which provides additional
protections for employee content if an employer accesses employee content for a
purpose specified in subsection (b)(3); and subsection (d), which provides
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additional protections when an employer, by virtue of lawful system monitoring
technology, gains access to login information for an employee's protected personal
online account.
Subsection 3(a)(1) provides that an employer may not require, coerce, or
request that the employee provide it with access to login information or content.
However, it allows an employer to request (though not to require or coerce) that the
employee add it to the list of persons to whom the employee grants access to the
account (to "friend" them, in common parlance). The intent is to balance the need
to protect employees against coercion with employees' understandable interest in
forming social connections with one another and with their employer.
Subsection 3(a)(2) provides that an employer may not punish an employee for
failing to comply with a requirement, coercive action, or request referred to in
subsection 3(a)(1). This ensures that, even with respect to a request to be added to
the list of contacts, the employee retains the ability to say "no" without fear of
reprisal.
Subsection 3(b) contains exceptions to the prohibitions in subsection 3(a).
Subsection 3(b)(2) lifts the act's prohibitions where an employer needs to access
employee content or login information in order to comply with a federal or state
law or court order, or with the rule of a self-regulatory organization established by
federal or state statute. The principal self-regulatory organizations intended here
are those defined the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26).
These self-regulatory organizations must access certain employee online account
information in order to fulfill their obligations to prevent market fraud and
manipulation. The act exempts them so that they can perform this vital role. This
exception is a narrow one. It is intended to apply only to self-regulatory
organizations, like those identified in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, that
are established by a federal or state statute. It is not intended to encompass a selfregulatory organization that an industry group or sector establishes absent such
statutory recognition.
Subsection 3(b)(3) establishes exceptions with respect to certain employer
demands or requests for content. It does not create any exceptions for employer
demands or requests for login information. This important distinction is intended to
ensure that login information, the disclosure of which poses special concerns and
dangers, including to cybersecurity, remains fully protected even in those
exceptional situations in which content does not.
Subsection 3(b)(3)(A)(ii) lifts the subsection 3(a) prohibitions regarding
accessing content (but not those prohibitions regarding login information) when an
employer is investigating whether an employee has violated an employer policy.
This is intended to be a narrow exception. As the act makes clear, it applies only
where: an employer bases its demand or request on "specific facts about the
employee's protected personal online account;" the employer policy is in a record
of which the employee had advance notice; the employer policy concerns "workrelated employee misconduct;" and the employer created the policy for a bona fide
business purpose and not primarily as a justification for accessing protected
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employee online content. These conditions are intended to ensure that the
exception is used only for good faith investigations into work-related employee
misconduct, and not to undermine the act's prohibitions absent compliance with
this narrow exception.
The subsection 3(b) exceptions limit the scope of the subsection 3(a)
prohibitions. They do not create affirmative rights. Thus, if a 3(b) exception were
to lift the 3(a) prohibitions with respect to a particular employer action, but another
law (e.g., the Fourth Amendment) were to forbid such employer action, the action
in question would remain illegal under that other law. The subsection 3(b)
exceptions function solely to limit the subsection 3(a) prohibitions. They do not
affect other federal or state laws that also may prohibit the actions in question and,
instead, would require reference to other law to determine if such actions are
lawful.
Subsection 3(c) clarifies that, even where the subsection 3(b)(3) exception
applies, it does not give employers carte blanche to access or alter the content ofthe
employee's protected account. Instead, subsection 3(c) requires an employer
utilizing the exception to reasonably attempt to limit its access to content that is
relevant to the purpose that justified the exception, use the content only for this
purpose, and refrain from altering content.
Subsection 3(d) takes account of the fact that employers, in conducting
information and communications system monitoring required for maintenance and
cybersecurity, may inadvertently gain access to login information for an
employee's protected personal online account. It makes clear that, while such
capture of login information does not, in itself, violate the act, employers must
exercise care with respect to such information. They should take reasonable steps
to secure the login information and should dispose of it as soon and as securely as is
reasonably practicable.
SECTION 4. PROTECTION OF STUDENT ONLINE ACCOUNT.
(a) Subject to the exceptions in subsection (b), an educational institution may
not:
(1) require, coerce, or request a student to:
(A) disclose the login information for a protected personal online
account;
(B) disclose the content of the account, except that an educational
institution may request a student to add the educational
institution to, or not remove the educational institution from, the
set of persons to which the student grants access to the content;
(C) alter the settings of the account in a manner that makes the
login information for or content of the account more accessible
to others; or
(D) access the account in the presence of the educational
institution in a manner that enables the educational institution to
observe the login information for or content of the account; or
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(2) take, or threaten to take, adverse action against a student for failure to
comply with:
(A) an educational institution requirement, coercive action, or
request, that violates paragraph (1); or
(B) an educational institution request under paragraph (1)(B) to
add the educational institution to, or not remove the educational
institution from, the set of persons to which the student grants
access to the content of a protected personal online account.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) shall prevent an educational institution from:
(1) accessing information about a student that is publicly available;
(2) complying with a federal or state law, court order, or rule of a selfregulatory organization established by federal or state statute; or
(3) requiring or requesting, based on specific facts about the student's
protected personal online account, access to the content of, but not the
login information for, the account in order to:
(A) ensure compliance, or investigate non-compliance, with:
(i) federal or state law; or
(ii) an educational institution prohibition against
education-related student misconduct of which the
student has reasonable notice, which is in a record, and
which was not created primarily to gain access to a
protected personal online account; or
(B) protect against:
(i) a threat to safety;
(ii) a threat to educational institution information
technology or communications technology systems or
to educational institution property; or
(iii) disclosure of information in which the educational
institution has a proprietary interest or information the
educational institution has a legal obligation to keep
confidential.
(c) An educational institution that accesses student content for a purpose
specified in subsection (b)(3):
(1) shall attempt reasonably to limit its access to content that is relevant to
the specified purpose;
(2) shall use the content only for the specified purpose; and
(3) may not alter the content unless necessary to achieve the specified
purpose.
(d) An educational institution that acquires the login information for a
student's protected personal online account by means of otherwise lawful
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technology that monitors the educational institution's network, or educational
institution-provided devices, for a network security, data confidentiality, or
system maintenance purpose:
(1) may not use the login information to access or enable another person
to access the account;
(2) shall make a reasonable effort to keep the login information secure;
(3) unless otherwise provided in paragraph (4), shall dispose of the login
information as soon as, as securely as, and to the extent reasonably
practicable; and
(4) shall, if the educational institution retains the login information for use
in an ongoing investigation of an actual or suspected breach of computer,
network, or data security, make a reasonable effort to keep the login
information secure and dispose of it as soon as, as securely as, and to the
extent reasonably practicable after completing the investigation.
Comment
Section 4 is similar to Section 3 except for the fact that it protects students
from educational institution demands and requests for access, rather than
employees from employer demands and requests. The comments that follow
Section 3 apply equally to Section 4, with the exception that "student" should be
substituted for "employee," and "educational institution" for "employer."
Subsection 4(b)(2) creates an exception for educational institution compliance
with the rules of self-regulatory organizations established by federal or state statute.
This exception is intended to apply only to self-regulatory organizations that a
federal and state statute recognizes in the way that the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26), recognizes self- regulatory organizations for
certain employers. It is not intended to encompass a self-regulatory organization
that an educational group or sector establishes absent such statutory recognition.
SECTION 5. CIVIL ACTION.
(a) The [Attorney General] may bring a civil action against an employer or
educational institution for a violation of this [act]. A prevailing [Attorney
General] may obtain[:
(1)] injunctive and other equitable reliefl; and
(2) a civil penalty of up to $[1000] for each violation, but not exceeding
$[ 100,000] for all violations caused by the same event].
(b) An employee or student may bring a civil action against the individual's
employer or educational institution for a violation of this [act]. A prevailing
employee or student may obtain:
(1) injunctive and other equitable relief;
(2) actual damages; and
(3) costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
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(c) An action under subsection (a) does not preclude an action under
subsection (b), and an action under subsection (b) does not preclude an action
under subsection (a).
(d) This [act] does not affect a right or remedy available under law other than
this [act].
Legislative Note: In subsection (a) an enacting state should replace "[Attorney
General]" with the appropriateenforcement authorityfor the state.
In subsection (a)(2), an enacting state that opts to empower its enforcement
authority to seek civilpenaltiesfor violation of the act should replace "$[1000]"
with the penalty amount it determines is appropriate, and should replace
"$[100,000]" with the amount it determinesshould be the maximum penaltyfor all
violations arisingfrom the same event.

Comment
Subsection 5(a)(2) gives an enacting state the option to define a maximum civil
penalty for each violation, and a maximum civil penalty for all violations caused by
the same act. The cap on the total penalty for all violations caused by a single act is
intended to prevent civil penalties from escalating to disproportionate levels. For
example, absent such a cap, where a state set the maximum civil penalty per
violation at $1000, an employer that sent an e-mail to 1000 employees requesting
the login information for, or content of, their protected online accounts in violation
of the act would face a penalty of up to $1,000,000 for this single act. Subsection
5(a)(2) is intended to avoid such disproportionate penalties by capping the
maximum civil penalty for all violations caused by the same act at a level that the
enacting state deems appropriate.
Subsection 5(b) establishes a private right of action for employees and
students.
No mental state is specified for a cause of action under either subsection 5(a) or
5(b).
Subsection 5(d) states that the act does not displace or otherwise affect a right
or remedy that may be available under law other than this act.
SECTION 6. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
In applying and construing this [act], consideration must be given to the need to
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that
enact it.
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SECTION 7. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL
AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act] modifies, limits, or supersedes
the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act, 15
U.S.C. Section 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices
described in Section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b).
Comment
This section responds to the specific language of the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act and is designed to avoid preemption of state
law under that federal legislation.
[SECTION 8. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this [act] or its application
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of this [act] which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [act] are severable.]
Legislative Note: Include this section only if this state lacks a generalseverability
statute or a decision by the highest court of this state stating a general rule of
severability.
SECTION 9. REPEALS; CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) ......
(b) ......
(c) ......
Legislative Note: UESOPPA is promulgatedas an integratedwhole by the Uniform
Law Commission. A jurisdictionthat wishes to adoptonly apartof UESOPPA will
need to make significantadjustments to it.
A jurisdiction that wishes to adopt only the employee provisions of the
UESOPPA should consider at least the following adjustments, including
renumbering to accountfor omittedprovisions:
Section 1: Short Title. Revise appropriately
Section 2: Definitions.
(2) Educationalinstitution. Omit
(6) Login information. Remove reference to "educational institution" and
"student"
(10) Protectedpersonalonline account. Remove references to
"educational institution" and "student"
(14) Student. Omit
Section 4: ProtectionofStudent Online Account. Omit
Section 5. Civil Action. Remove references to "educational institution" and
"student"

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/3

78

Thumma: When You Cannot Just Say No: Protecting the Online Privacy of Emp
2017]

WHEN YOU CANNOT "JUST SAY No"

79

A jurisdiction that wishes to adopt only the student provisions of the
UESOPPA should consider at least the following adjustments, including
renumberingto accountfor omittedprovisions:

Section 1: Short Title. Revise appropriately
Section 2: Definitions.

(4) Employee. Omit
(5) Employer. Omit
(6) Login information. Remove reference to "employer" and "employee"
(10) Protectedpersonalonline account. Remove references to "employer"
and "employee"
Section 3. ProtectionofEmployee Online Account. Omit

Section 5. Civil Action. Remove references to "employer" and "employee"
Comment
An enacting state may need to amend the state's laws by repealing any
conflicting statutory provisions. It may place these repeals in this section ofthe act.
SECTION 10. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect ....
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